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BETWEEN HOME AND SCHOOL 
LAURA A. ROSENBURY†
INTRODUCTION  
Family law in the United States has long embraced the image of a 
triangle to describe the allocation of legal authority over childrearing.  
Parents, children, and the state stand at the three points of this trian-
gle.1  Much of family law concerns when parental authority over chil-
dren should trump state interests, when state interests should trump 
parental authority, and when children’s own rights should trump ei-
ther.  Although struggles over authority remain, a general principle 
has long been clear:  absent abuse or other forms of perceived family 
default,2 parents enjoy almost complete authority over their children 
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1 See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE:  
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 795 (5th ed. 2005) (referring to 
“the triangular relationship between the child, the family, and the state”); Catherine J. 
Ross, Anything Goes:  Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial 
Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 435 (2000) (discussing “perpetual stresses along three 
sides of a triangle with endpoints labeled PCS:  Parent, Child, and State”); Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism:  An Environmentalist Approach to Protecting Endangered 
Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 422 (2005) (“As a teacher of constitutional and 
family law for over fifteen years, I have illustrated the tensions between parents, chil-
dren and the state with a triangular diagram.”). 
2 Such default can include poverty, poverty-related neglect, and divorce.  See MIMI 
ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN:  SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM CO-
LONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 313-14, 349-53 (1988) (discussing how families receiv-
ing financial assistance from the state are subject to strict state control); Clare Hunt-
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at home, whereas the state may exercise authority over children at 
school by mandating school attendance and regulating educational 
curricula—even those of private and home schools.  With limited ex-
ceptions, children have few rights in either realm.3
This settled equilibrium ignores a fundamental reality:  children 
are not confined to home and school.  Much of childhood takes place 
in spaces between home and school:  in playgrounds, parks, child care 
centers, churches, community gyms, sporting fields, dance studios, 
music rooms, after-school clubs, and cyberspace.  Family law has been 
virtually silent about what happens or should happen in these spaces.4  
Either the childrearing that takes place in them is ignored altogether, 
or it is seen as an extension of the childrearing that takes place in ei-
ther home or school,5 obscuring the distinct childrearing that can be 
ington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 667-70 (2006) (discussing 
some states’ frequent practice of removing children from their parents’ care because 
of poverty-related neglect not involving physical abuse); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of 
Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 581 (2000) (“Never-married or divorced parents 
are subjected to state investigation and direction on a scale that would be considered 
unthinkable in the context of married parents in an intact family.”). 
3 See Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 29 (“The competition for developmental control of a child is 
classically framed as a competition between parent and state.”). 
4 Notable exceptions can be found in the work of Barbara Bennett Woodhouse 
and Kenneth Karst, both of whom have discussed how children are influenced by the 
media and advertising industries.  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and 
the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967, 1002-11 (2003); Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, Reframing the Debate About the Socialization of Children:  An Environmentalist Para-
digm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 97-119.  For more discussion of Woodhouse’s and 
Karst’s work, see infra text accompanying notes 56-62.  Other scholars have criticized 
the simplicity of the triangle model, but those scholars have limited their analysis to 
the context of abuse and neglect.  See, e.g., Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Par-
ent-Child-State Triangle in Public Family Law:  The Importance of Private Providers in the De-
pendency System, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1400 (1999) (criticizing the triangle as “an in-
complete model for the complexity of family law, especially as it applies to abused and 
neglected children in the dependency system”); Ellen Marrus, Fostering Family Ties:  The 
State as Maker and Breaker of Kinship Relationships, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 319, 351 (“The 
triangle of state, parent, and child that is usually invoked in family matters is too sim-
plistic.  It fails to reflect that the child has family connections, such as siblings, beyond 
the parent-child relationship.”). 
5 See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES:  FOSTERING CAPACITY, 
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 24 (2006) (discussing “neighborhood organizations 
[that] provide after-school and athletic programs for children” as examples of “institu-
tions of civil society” that “may also play a vital role in shaping and supporting fami-
lies”); Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 86 (“The traditional paradigm pitting parents 
against the state is deeply rooted in American family jurisprudence.  On one side . . . 
are parents and the private institutions—from soccer clubs to churches to boot camps 
for defiant teens—that families deputize as their agents in guiding their children’s de-
velopment and instilling in their children the values that they hold dear.”). 
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performed between home and school by individuals other than par-
ents, state actors, or children themselves.  The triangle thus remains 
intact, and the spaces and actors between and around its three points 
are rendered invisible. 
This Article explores what it would mean for family law to con-
sider explicitly all of the sites of childrearing, the actors who occupy 
those sites, and the types of childrearing that take place at those sites.  
Part I draws upon social science literature to identify the diverse 
spaces of childhood and the actors who socialize children in those 
spaces.  The social science literature confirms that home and school 
are indeed important sites of childrearing, but that children are also 
socialized in other spaces by various actors.  The identity of those ac-
tors, and the degree of their influence, varies from child to child in 
ways that may correlate to class, race, geography, religion, gender, or 
parental philosophy.  The important common denominator, however, 
is that the actors in these other spaces are rarely the children’s parents 
or teachers.  The social science literature reveals that children know 
that they are interacting with actors who are neither their parents nor 
their teachers—and that they respond differently than they would ei-
ther at home or at school. 
The current scope of family law implies that childrearing between 
home and school is not important to child socialization.  The social 
science literature refutes this inference, explaining the vital roles that 
such childrearing plays in child development.  It is not only social sci-
entists, however, who have noticed the importance of childrearing 
that occurs between home and school.  Though such childrearing has 
been largely ignored within family law scholarship, it played a pivotal 
role in a high-profile Supreme Court case:  Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale.6  Dale was not a family law case, nor was it framed as otherwise 
concerning childrearing, but the central question presented was who 
may control messages conveyed to boys during Boy Scout activities, 
conducted in various spaces other than home or school.  The Boy 
Scouts argued that it had a First Amendment right to choose, free 
from state regulation, the adults who help the organization instill val-
ues in boys.7  James Dale, a troop leader who was expelled from the 
Boy Scouts after the organization learned he was gay, argued that the 
Boy Scouts was subject to New Jersey’s public accommodations law, 
which prohibits private organizations like the Boy Scouts from dis-
6 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
7 Id. at 644, 653. 
  
836 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 833 
 
criminating on the basis of sexual orientation.8  The Supreme Court 
sided with the Boy Scouts, holding that the organization was entitled 
to teach by example the values of heterosexuality.9  The case thus pro-
vides an opportunity to begin a legal exploration of the childrearing 
that exists between and around the three points of the family law tri-
angle. 
Part II proceeds to provide a family law reading of the Dale case, 
situating the holding in relation to family law’s traditional approaches 
to questions concerning the allocation of childrearing authority.  Al-
though many commentators already have analyzed Dale, this Article 
provides the first analysis from a family law perspective.  Analogizing 
the Boy Scouts’s activities to those performed by parents within the 
home provides support for the Supreme Court’s decision, as parents 
also are given much room to instill values in their children free from 
state regulation.  Analogizing the Boy Scouts’s activities to those per-
formed at school provides support for the opposite result, because 
even private schools are subject to state regulations prohibiting dis-
crimination.  These conflicting outcomes indicate that analogies to 
home and school can be of limited utility when analyzing childrearing 
that takes place between home and school. 
Part III therefore calls for a theory that acknowledges childrearing 
between home and school for what it is, as opposed to how it is similar 
to the childrearing that takes place at either home or school.  Such a 
theory initially would not have to call for state regulation, or for non-
regulation, in the spaces between home and school.  Rather, the very 
acknowledgment of this childrearing could contribute to existing at-
tempts within family law to better reflect the reality of family life.  Be-
yond better reflecting the reality of family life, acknowledging this 
childrearing could also reshape aspects of family life.  Family law’s ne-
glect of this childrearing, however benign, necessarily shapes family 
behavior to some extent:  home and school are salient to parents and 
children in part because these are the spaces subject to explicit state 
regulation or nonregulation.  Legal acknowledgment of the spaces be-
tween home and school could allow these other spaces to take on 
some of the socialization that is currently thought to be properly per-
formed only at home or school. 
Once childrearing between home and school is acknowledged, 
family law scholars could begin to address how the law should respond 
8 Id. at 645. 
9 Id. at 659. 
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to various attempts by parents, the state, and other actors to exert con-
trol over childrearing activities occurring in the spaces between home 
and school.  Family law’s current silence about this childrearing could 
reflect, by default, a normative view of parental control over children 
in all spaces but school.  Pursuant to such a view, family privacy is not 
limited to the home, but rather attaches to the childrearing func-
tion—even when that function is performed outside of the home or 
performed by parental surrogates instead of parents themselves.  If 
family law scholars do in fact support this view, it would be useful to 
have its rationale explicitly articulated, particularly because courts do 
not always reinforce parental control in the spaces between home and 
school.  Indeed, various cases have upheld state regulations that tem-
per parents’ authority when their children are between home and 
school.  These cases challenge the idea that there is broad support for 
a normative view that parents should control such childrearing. 
The last Section of Part III posits the beginnings of an alternative 
normative approach to childrearing between home and school, one 
that supports parental prerogatives yet also calls on states to ensure 
that children are exposed to diverse ways of life in these spaces.  This 
proposed theory is grounded in the value of liberal pluralism that 
permeates much of family law, but the theory also seeks to promote 
pluralism within the family.  Childrearing between home and school 
thus becomes the exclusive domain of neither parents nor the state, 
but rather is acknowledged as a vital part of civil society and is sus-
tained accordingly.  Finally, Part IV offers a brief conclusion highlight-
ing how this theory of childrearing might affect some of the founda-
tional normative positions of family law as a whole. 
I.  THE SPACES OF CHILDHOOD 
Much of family law revolves around children.  For example, states 
specify who may be legal parents,10 the minimum level of care those 
parents must provide,11 and the consequences for failing to meet that 
10 For discussions of the various ways the states currently determine parental 
status, see June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood:  Uncertainty at the Core of 
Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1314-32 (2005); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a 
Time of Transition:  Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 132-43 (2006). 
11 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:  The 
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 
879, 885 (1984) (“Parents must care for their child, support him financially, see to his 
education, and provide him proper medical care.  They have the duty to control the 
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standard.12  It is thus not surprising that family law’s approach to chil-
dren focuses largely on the allocation of childrearing authority be-
tween parents and the state.  This focus is reflected in the titles of 
casebooks, such as Children, Parents, and The Law:  Public and Private 
Authority in the Home, Schools, and Juvenile Courts13 and Child, Family, and 
State,14 as well as in casebook chapter headings like “Allocating Power 
over Children:  Parental Rights and State Authority.”15  The focus is 
also reflected in family law scholarship, with law review articles enti-
tled Medical Decision Making for and by Children:  Tensions Between Parent, 
State, and Child 16 and Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, 
Child and the State 17 or containing section headings like “The Place of 
Children in a Dispute Between Parents and the State”18 and “The Ver-
tical Context:  Protecting Families Against the Government.”19
Recent law review articles, both explicitly within family law and 
not, continue this trend.  For example, Anne Dailey argues that family 
law should embrace a developmental approach to childrearing be-
cause that approach maintains that the early parent-child relationship, 
rather than school curricula controlled by the state, plays the deter-
minative role in cultivating democratic skills and values in young peo-
child, and if they fail in this duty, they may be required to answer for the child’s 
wrongdoings.” (footnotes omitted)); Leslie J. Harris et al., Making and Breaking Connec-
tions Between Parents’ Duty To Support and Right To Control Their Children, 69 OR. L. REV. 
689, 693-96, 702-09 (1990) (describing how “during the nineteenth century American 
courts and legislatures established that under the private law, parents have a legal duty 
to support their children” and delineating current obligations in the “intact family” 
and “the family following divorce”). 
12 Namely, states may exercise jurisdiction over children when they are abused or 
neglected by their parents.  Definitions of abuse and neglect vary from state to state, 
but all hinge on default of parental duties.  See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 423 
(“Provision of services and support [by the state] is the exception to the rule of auton-
omy, and generally must be tied to some finding or admission of family failure and 
dysfunction. . . . Thus, the model depends on parental fault as a predicate for state en-
gagement in the life of the child.”). 
13 LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE LAW:  PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS (2002). 
14 MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 1. 
15 SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM:  CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 1 (3rd ed. 2004). 
16 Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children:  Tensions Between 
Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 311. 
17 Buss, supra note 3, at 27. 
18 Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood:  Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child 
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 383 (1998). 
19 Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy:  A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 627, 644 (1987). 
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ple.20  A similar focus on allocating power between parents and the 
state can be found in a recent article by First Amendment scholar 
Eugene Volokh, who argues that parents in both “intact” and “split” 
families should have First Amendment rights to speak to their chil-
dren free from state restrictions imposed pursuant to a “best interests 
of the child” custody standard.21
This focus on the appropriate allocation of childrearing authority 
between parents and the state reflects a deep concern about the so-
cialization of children.  Family law doctrine and scholarship empha-
size that, although families are major sites for socializing children,22 
states also play a socializing role by mandating school attendance, set-
ting curricular standards, adjudicating custody disputes, and specify-
ing the minimum requirements for childrearing within the home.  
Debate continues within family law about where to draw the line be-
tween parental and state authority, but three aspects of family law dis-
course have remained constant. 
First, parents and the state exercise authority over children.  This 
authority often is illustrated by inverting family law’s triangle image 
and positioning parents and the state at the top two points and chil-
dren at the bottom point.  This orientation of the triangle emphasizes 
that children are rarely given power to control their own destinies, but 
rather are subject to the decisions of either their parents or the state.23  
Parents and the states exercise different types of authority, however; 
parents exercise private power over children, whereas the states exer-
cise public power.  Therefore, other scholars flip the triangle back on 
its base, placing the state at the apex and parents and children at the 
20 Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 482–88 (2006) (arguing 
that “early caregiving” provides the optimal preconditions for developing children’s 
capacities for “personal choice and democratic participation”). 
21 Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 631, 712-21 (2006) (asserting that such restrictions violate the “parents’ self-
expression interests and the children’s interests as hearers”). 
22 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the 
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions.”); Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 409 (“Families not only nurture and protect chil-
dren, but they also teach them to be citizens of a larger society.”). 
23 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1994) (describing how disputes involving children are not in 
fact triangular but instead are “legally bilateral” because “the conflicts primarily in-
volve the state and the mediating entity—the family or other custodian—without the 
independent, autonomous voice of the child being heard in the formal legal contro-
versies”). 
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bottom two points.24  This conception emphasizes that children exist 
with their parents in the lower, private realm, and that the state 
crosses into that “zone of privacy” only to further public goals, such as 
citizenship development and the protection of children’s general wel-
fare; otherwise, parents have control over “personal values and 
choices regarding children’s development.”25
Regardless of the orientation of family law’s triangle image, the 
three points of the triangle remain constant.  This is the second point 
of agreement within family law discourse:  that parents and the state 
are the primary, if not the only, actors who engage in the socialization 
of children.26  Other actors are not part of the triangle, symbolizing 
the importance of parents and the state, as well as highlighting the 
law’s exclusion of other parties who could, and often do, influence 
children.27
The final constant aspect of family law discourse spatially situates 
the socialization of children, at home and at school.  Although this 
aspect of the discourse is often less explicit than the first two points of 
agreement, it flows naturally from those points of agreement.  If par-
ents and the state are the primary actors who engage in the socializa-
tion of children, and parents have authority over private matters, 
while the state has authority over public matters, then parents gener-
ally exert influence over children when they are at home, whereas the 
state generally can reach children only when they are at school and 
thus subject to state educational policies. 
Scholars in other disciplines also have studied the location of 
child socialization.  Most notably, sociologists and social geographers 
24 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse follows this approach.  See Woodhouse, supra note 
1, at 423; Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 88. 
25 Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 88; see also Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 423 (“As 
depicted in this diagram, the most salient fact about the relation of the family and the 
state is that authority over children is allocated to the private sphere of the family.  It 
suggests that children only have a relationship with the state when the wall of family 
privacy has been pierced.”). 
26 For another example of this focus, see MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 70 (stating that 
her approach “accepts the dual authority of parents and schools to nurture children’s 
capacities” because “[p]arents educate children about what it means to be part of a 
particular way of life; schools, through cultivating skills of critical reflection and per-
spective-taking, help children learn that there are other ways of life deserving of re-
spect”). 
27 Cf. Buss, supra note 3, at 29 (stating that family law’s traditional view of the 
“competition for developmental control of a child . . . oversimplifies the field of po-
tential competitors considerably”). 
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have increasingly examined the spaces of childhood.28  This literature, 
much like family law doctrine and scholarship, acknowledges that 
home and school remain important sites for the socialization of chil-
dren.29  Nonetheless, the social science literature emphasizes that so-
cialization also takes place in many other spaces, including public 
spaces such as municipal playgrounds, sports fields, and parks, as well 
as private spaces like churches, clubs, day care centers, and other loca-
tions of various after-school instruction.30
That such spaces exist is common sense for most of us.  Their im-
portance may not be.  These spaces often have been viewed as mere 
holding areas between home and school—as spaces of childcare or 
recreation, as opposed to spaces of child socialization or childrearing.  
The focus of family law tends to support such a view.  The failure of 
most family law scholars to consider any spaces of child socialization 
other than home and school could suggest that these scholars believe 
that little meaningful socialization takes place outside of those two lo-
cations.  The remainder of this Part first shows how social science lit-
erature refutes this suggestion; it then examines the legal implications 
of that literature. 
A.  Social Science Insights 
Social science studies reveal that the spaces between home and 
school are far from meaningless.  Instead, such spaces have func-
28 For examples of social scientists’ examinations of the spaces of childhood,  
see STUART C. AITKEN, FAMILY FANTASIES AND COMMUNITY SPACE 94-104 (1998); STU-
ART C. AITKEN, GEOGRAPHIES OF YOUNG PEOPLE:  THE MORALLY CONTESTED SPACES OF 
IDENTITY 1-26 (2001); CHILDREN IN THE CITY:  HOME, NEIGHBOURHOOD AND COMMU-
NITY (Pia Christensen & Margaret O’Brien eds., 2003); CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES:  
PLAYING, LIVING, LEARNING (Sarah L. Holloway & Gill Valentine eds., 2000); COOL 
PLACES:  GEOGRAPHIES OF YOUTH CULTURES (Tracey Skelton & Gill Valentine eds., 
1998); ALLISON JAMES ET AL., THEORIZING CHILDHOOD 37-58 (1998); ANNETTE 
LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS:  CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE 14-32, 165-97 (2003); 
CHRISTOPHER SPENCER ET AL., THE CHILD IN THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT:  THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF SPATIAL KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITION 3-11 (1989). 
29 See, e.g., Sarah L. Holloway & Gill Valentine, Spatiality and the New Social Studies of 
Childhood, 34 SOC. 763, 770-76 (2000) (describing the relative effects of school and the 
home on the socialization of children). 
30 See, e.g., Sarah L. Holloway & Gill Valentine, Children’s Geographies and the New 
Social Studies of Childhood, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 1, 19-20 (in-
troducing various academic perspectives on the importance of geography in the so-
cialization of children); see also supra note 28 (referencing a sampling of the social sci-
ence literature that explores the spaces of child socialization). 
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tioned as more than places of play or childcare in the past,31 and they 
continue to play a vital role in children’s socialization today.  Studies 
of these spaces are complex, and an exhaustive review of all of their 
aspects is beyond the scope of this Article.  Even so, the social science 
literature suggests that spaces between home and school contribute to 
the socialization of children in at least three important ways. 
First, the social science literature emphasizes that childhood, al-
though rooted in biological age, is also a social construction, consti-
tuted both structurally and through daily practice.32  In the Western 
world, much of this daily practice occurs at home and at school,33 as 
family law scholars have emphasized.  Nonetheless, the spaces between 
home and school also are vital to this daily practice.  These “between” 
spaces are important in part because children actually spend time in 
31 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION:  THE METROPOLITAN EX-
PERIENCE 1876-1980, at 273 (1988) (describing a “broader configuration of education” 
that had developed by the 1870s, consisting of “Sunday schools, academies, colleges, 
seminaries, publishing houses, libraries, almshouses, orphan asylums, reformatories, 
and the churches themselves”); Elizabeth A. Gagen, Playing the Part:  Performing Gender 
in America’s Playgrounds, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 213, 216-17 
(discussing the “playground movement” in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at the end of 
the nineteenth century). 
32 Thus, childhood is not a naturally occurring state, but rather is an “actively ne-
gotiated set of social relationships.”  Alan Prout & Allison James, A New Paradigm for the 
Sociology of Childhood?  Provenance, Promise and Problems, in CONSTRUCTING AND RE-
CONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD:  CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF 
CHILDHOOD 7, 7 (Allison James & Alan Prout eds., 1990).  Indeed, conceptions and 
articulations of immaturity have varied across cultures and time.  See, e.g., PHILIPPE 
ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD:  A  SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 15-133 (Robert 
Baldick trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1962) (1960) (tracing the development of the “idea of 
childhood” over time); Holloway & Valentine, supra note 30, at 2-6 (providing an over-
view of the literature on changing conceptions of immaturity); Allison James, Under-
standing Childhood from an Interdisciplinary Perspective:  Problems and Potentials, in RE-
THINKING CHILDHOOD 25, 28 (Peter B. Pufall & Richard P. Unsworth eds., 2004) 
(arguing that “[t]he socially constructed character of childhood” is demonstrated by 
looking at “differing legal, social, and cultural expectations about children” across cul-
tures); Prout & James, supra, at 7 (“The immaturity of children is a biological fact of 
life but the ways in which this immaturity is understood and made meaningful is a fact 
of culture.”); see also VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD:  THE CHANG-
ING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985) (tracking the evolution of the concept of 
childhood and the value of children between the 1870s and 1930s).  Accordingly, al-
though statements about children’s needs may often be masked as empirical claims, 
they are almost always the product of social and cultural choices.  See Martin Wood-
head, Psychology and the Cultural Construction of Children’s Needs, in CONSTRUCTING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD, supra, at 60, 60-66. 
33 See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 28, at 38 (discussing the ways in which families 
and schools play a primary role in the construction of childhood in the Western world, 
serving as “regimes of discipline, learning, development, maturation and skill”). 
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them.  But more saliently, home and school are defined against these 
other spaces; home and school could not fulfill their respective social-
izing roles without the “free” spaces surrounding them.  Indeed, 
home and school acquire meaning for children primarily in contrast 
to the spaces that are not home or school.  Understanding what hap-
pens outside of home and school is therefore crucial to understanding 
the socialization that happens within home and school. 
Second, the social science literature delineates the manner in 
which children between home and school are exposed to community 
members who are neither their parents nor their teachers.  The iden-
tity of these actors, and the degree of their influence, varies from 
child to child in ways that may correlate to class, race, geography, re-
ligion, gender, or parental philosophy.  For instance, children from 
affluent families are more likely to be involved in organized activities 
between home and school than children from less affluent families, 
who tend to engage in more informal activities, often with other chil-
dren.34  This trend is consistent among black and white children,35 al-
though black middle-class parents are often more conscious than 
white middle-class parents about the racial composition of their chil-
dren’s activities, purposely steering their children toward both all-
black and racially mixed activities.36  Similarly, religious parents often 
encourage their children to participate in activities sponsored by reli-
gious institutions, in addition to sports or arts-related activities.37  
Whatever the activity, children encounter community members dur-
ing these activities, and these community members frequently convey 
information about community values and practices.  This information 
does not replace the messages that children receive at home or school 
from their parents and teachers, but children do balance this informa-
tion against those other messages.38
34 See LAREAU, supra note 28, at 35-36 (identifying various factors that lead to class 
disparities in differing forms of childhood activities). 
35 Id. at 240-41, 282. 
36 For examples of scholars noting these trends, see id. at 120-24, 168-69; Patricia 
Hill Collins, Shifting the Center:  Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing About Motherhood, in 
MOTHERING:  IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 45, 54-55 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et 
al. eds., 1994). 
37 For examples, see LAREAU, supra note 28, at 110-20, 185-86. 
38 See, e.g., Stuart C. Aitken, Global Crises of Childhood:  Rights, Justice and the Unchild-
like Child, 33 AREA 119, 123 (2001) (discussing how messages from outside the home 
are “received, internalized, resisted and mobilized” by children); Mary Gauvain, So-
ciocultural Contexts of Learning, in LEARNING IN CULTURAL CONTEXT:  FAMILY, PEERS, 
AND SCHOOL 11, 12-19 (Ashley E. Maynard & Mary I. Martini eds., 2005) (examining 
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Moreover, the content of the information can be less important 
than the actors conveying the information and the location in which 
they do so.  Because the information is not directly accompanied by 
the authority of a parent or teacher, children may be more or less re-
ceptive to it.  In addition, because the information is conveyed in loca-
tions that are not generally associated with parental discipline or edu-
cation, children may not even realize that they are receiving 
information, because they may be more focused on playing or taking a 
break from the lessons of home and school.  Ideas of appropriate 
community behavior are often internalized in this way, particularly 
ideas regarding acceptable gender and racial performances, as well as 
information about other issues valued by the community and by vari-
ous subcommunities.39
Finally, children can create their own identities in these spaces be-
tween home and school and, in doing so, can influence other chil-
dren’s identities as well.  By focusing on the respective roles of parents 
and the state in childrearing, legal scholars often ignore the roles that 
children play in both their own socialization and the socialization of 
other children.40  The social science literature emphasizes that chil-
dren are not just passive recipients of childrearing; rather, they also 
play an active role in shaping their own worlds and the worlds of other 
children.41  Indeed, children often may be more influenced by other 
how “the child’s participation in cultural activity” influences learning and socializa-
tion). 
39 See, e.g., Gagen, supra note 31, at 213 (describing how “[e]ducational establish-
ments, loosely defined” are often “the spaces through which children become aware 
of, and begin reproducing, social identities that circulate through broader social 
space”); Fiona Smith & John Barker, “Out of School,” In School:  A Social Geography of Out 
of School Childcare, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 245, 247-54 (describ-
ing the role of British “out of school clubs” in shaping interactions between children 
and children’s worldviews). 
40 See Buss, supra note 3, at 30 (identifying the child herself as “another, often 
overlooked, private competitor for developmental control” over children); cf. Rosalind 
Edwards & Miriam David, Where Are the Children in Home-School Relations?  Notes Towards 
a Research Agenda, 11 CHILD. & SOC’Y 194, 195 (1997) (stating that the “prevalent 
home-school orthodoxy” in the field of sociology “does not consider children, either as 
individual or collective participants in the process” of education). 
41 See, e.g., Prout & James, supra note 32, at 8 (“Children are and must be seen as 
active in the construction and determination of their own social lives, the lives of those 
around them and of the societies in which they live.”); Buss, supra note 3, at 34 (point-
ing out that a child necessarily exercises some control over her own development, 
“whether she likes it or not,” because “[s]he reacts when parents, the state, or anyone 
else, acts in an attempt to shape her development, and she reacts to the host of envi-
ronmental and cultural forces that exist without regard to her development”); Emily 
Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State, 
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children than by their parents, teachers, or other community mem-
bers.42  Of course, children’s opportunities to express themselves and, 
in turn, to influence other children, are greater in some spaces than 
others.  At home and school, their freedom is generally limited by 
strict schedules, school curricula, and discipline by parents or teach-
ers.  Children often enjoy more freedom between home and school, 
but not always.  For example, playgrounds, parks, and streets generally 
provide more opportunity for self-expression and influence than is 
typically found at home or school,43 whereas some religious or organ-
ized sports activities may provide less freedom.  Regardless of the de-
gree of freedom afforded to children in these spaces, however, chil-
dren often express their identities differently than they would at 
school or home.  This is because these spaces play a less dominant 
role in the structuring of childhood, and their boundaries are more 
ambiguous.44
In sum, the social science literature reveals that the spaces be-
tween home and school are vital to understanding how children are 
constituted and socialized in our existing society.  These spaces are 
important as locations, because they provide the boundaries of chil-
dren’s experiences of home and school.  The contents of the spaces 
are also important, because children are exposed to diverse actors 
within the spaces, including other children, and children may per-
form their identities—and influence other children’s identities—
differently than they would at home or school.  The spaces between 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2000) [hereinafter Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake] (“What 
matters to adolescent development is relationships with peers, because it is largely 
through these relationships that they pursue the difficult and important task of iden-
tity formation—the sorting and selecting of values, beliefs, and tastes that will define 
their adult selves.”). 
42 See, e.g., JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION:  WHY CHILDREN 
TURN OUT THE WAY THEY DO 147-71 (1998) (describing the influences of peers on 
children’s behavior); Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake, supra note 41, at 1270-76 (exploring 
the role of peers in adolescence); cf. MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 82 (“Public discourse 
tends to ‘go to extremes’ about families, assuming either that family structure alone 
wholly determines a child’s fate, or that parents have almost no impact on their chil-
dren’s development, with peers exerting a far more important influence.  The truth 
surely lies somewhere in the middle.” (endnote omitted)). 
43 See generally Hugh Matthews et al., The “Street as Thirdspace”, in CHILDREN’S GE-
OGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 63. 
44 See, e.g., Pia Christensen et al., Home and Movement:  Children Constructing “Family 
Time”, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 139, 143-48, 153-54 (describing 
how children’s understandings of themselves and their families is achieved through 
movement in, out, and around the home, and how movement in general is formative 
of children’s social learning). 
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home and school, therefore, can tell us a great deal about the “who,” 
“what,” and “where” of the socialization of children in the United 
States. 
B.  Legal Implications 
In contrast to the social science literature, family law’s focus on 
the respective roles of parents and the state in the rearing of children 
ignores any childrearing that is not performed at home or school by 
parents or the state.  Socialization that occurs between home and 
school is therefore rendered legally invisible.  If such invisibility re-
flects the view of family law scholars that little meaningful socializa-
tion takes place between home and school, the social science litera-
ture greatly challenges that view. 
Alternatively, family law’s neglect of childrearing between home 
and school may reflect some scholars’ views about the proper scope of 
legal regulation.  As discussed more fully in Part II below, families 
have long been afforded certain protections from such regulation.45  
Consistent with this respect for family privacy, once a parent-child re-
lationship is established, it is generally seen as existing outside of the 
law except in two instances.  First, the state may intervene, in order to 
protect the welfare of children, when parents fail to perform their 
childrearing responsibilities or cannot resolve disputes with a co-
parent.  Second, in order to ensure that children are properly pre-
pared for the obligations of citizenship, the state may require families 
to educate their children.  Childrearing between home and school 
falls within neither of these traditional exceptions to family privacy.  
Therefore, even if meaningful socialization takes place between home 
and school, this childrearing could be viewed as properly subsumed 
under family privacy, outside of the law’s reach.46
This normative view of childrearing between home and school 
does not require family law to remain silent about such childrearing, 
however.  The scope of family privacy—and its very existence—is hotly 
contested within the law.47  Many scholars have long argued that fam-
45 See infra text accompanying notes 112-126. 
46 Cf. Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 86 (describing how the “traditional paradigm” 
in family law aligns organizations “from soccer clubs to churches to boot camps for de-
fiant teens” with private parental power). 
47 See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 128-33 (1989) 
(discussing four flaws with the public/private dichotomy); Frances E. Olsen, The Family 
and the Market:  A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1567-69 
(1983) (asserting that “[p]olarizing the family and the market does not increase the 
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ily privacy should be tempered because it harms individuals with rela-
tively little private power, particularly women and children,48 and 
masks the various ways that the public and private realms are interde-
pendent.49  The very debate emphasizes that family privacy is a legal 
construct, a product of policy choices rather than a reflection of a pre-
existing reality.  The spaces between home and school thus need not 
be subsumed by an extension of family privacy.  Moreover, as dis-
cussed more fully in Part III below, courts have viewed such spaces as 
worthy of regulation in several contexts.50
In addition, even those who advocate expansive notions of family 
privacy could find it useful to examine the ways in which childhood is 
shaped and constructed by family law’s nearly exclusive focus on the 
socializing power of parents and the state, at home and at school re-
spectively.  The social science literature is notably silent about the 
law’s role in the construction of childhood.  Many judges and legal 
scholars also have not explicitly viewed childhood as a social construc-
tion,51 instead viewing childhood—and the corresponding rights and 
disabilities that attach to it—primarily as a function of biological age.  
Nonetheless, laws in the United States have long reflected an under-
standing of childhood as a social construction, for they specify the dif-
ferent ages at which children become legal adults for purposes of 
marriage, sexual activity, employment, driving, drinking, voting, and 
criminal prosecution.  Moreover, lawmakers have, at times, changed 
those ages for reasons other than new understandings of maturity.52  
possibilities available to individuals and the human personality,” and arguing that soci-
ety should “transcend” the “market/family dichotomy”). 
48 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 
974-79 (1991) (describing “the ways in which concepts of privacy permit, encourage, 
and reinforce violence against women”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the 
Child?”:  Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1037–
68 (1992) (providing a historical analysis of power in family relationships). 
49 See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 
955, 1028 (1993) (“[T]he domestic sphere neither is nor should be a sphere free from 
governmental regulation; rather, the state properly defines many central aspects of 
family life.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1207, 1208 (1999) (“The metaphor of ‘symbiosis’ seems more appropriate than 
the separate spheres imagery:  the family is located within the state. . . . [F]amily and 
state are interactive; they define one another.” (footnote omitted)). 
50 See infra text accompanying notes 176-192. 
51 One notable exception is Barbara Bennett Woodhouse.  See Woodhouse, supra 
note 4, at 113 (“Modern scholars recognize that childhood is a culturally constructed 
idea, rather than a universal fact.”). 
52 See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 13, at 494 (“The age of majority is arbi-
trary not in the sense that it is unreasonable but in that it is variable from time to time 
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Similarly, courts have determined that children enjoy adult-like rights 
of privacy and association for some purposes, but for other purposes, 
children must wait until adulthood before they may exercise full 
autonomy.53  The legal meaning of childhood is thus fluid and shift-
ing, and that legal construction affects children’s experiences of 
childhood. 
On a less explicit level, children’s experiences of childhood are 
also affected by the law’s focus on childrearing only at home or at 
school.  The rights of parents to control childrearing in the home 
pursuant to notions of family privacy, and the right of the state to con-
trol—or at least regulate—childrearing that takes place at school, 
means that these spaces of home and school are salient to children, 
parents, and the rest of society.  Other spaces, in contrast, can be seen 
as insignificant because they are not worthy of the law’s protection or 
intervention, even if they are significant sites of learning and identity 
formation, as the social science literature illustrates.  The law’s focus 
on the appropriate allocation of childrearing authority between par-
ents and the state can also create a perception of the child as an ob-
ject to be possessed,54 which, in turn, can affect children’s perceptions 
of their own autonomy and of who should be significant in their lives.  
The law confines its analysis to whether children should belong to 
parents or to the state, instead of adopting a broader approach that 
considers how children are socialized by various actors in diverse 
spaces. 
Childhood is thus shaped in part by the current scope of family 
law doctrine—both its substance and its omissions.  These omissions, 
by their very nature, make certain childhood experiences invisible 
within family law discourse.  Because family law itself is also a con-
and is often established to reflect some, but not all, levels of maturity and capacity.”); 
cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 n.152 
(1991) (“[T]he Twenty-Sixth Amendment extending the franchise to eighteen-year-
olds grew out of the perceived unfairness of any gap between the Vietnam draft age 
and the voting age.”).
53 See, e.g., David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1117, 1117-20 (2003) (describing various ways in which “chil-
dren occupy decidedly shadowy ground in the constitutional law protecting family pri-
vacy”). 
54 See Woodhouse, supra note 48, at 1114 (describing how the traditional focus on 
parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of their children produces a conception of 
children as the “conduit for the parents’ religious expression, cultural identity, and 
class aspirations”). 
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struction,55 these experiences need not remain invisible.  Over the 
past few years, two legal scholars have begun to examine this discon-
nect between law and reality in one particular context:  the effect of 
the media and advertising industries on children’s socialization.  Both 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and Kenneth Karst have illustrated how 
these industries supplement, and often supplant, parental and state 
authority over children.56  For Karst, “the media are performing much 
of the homogenizing, standardizing function once claimed for the 
common school,” 57 and they “compete . . . powerfully with parents’ 
and schools’ voices on sex and sexuality.”58  For Woodhouse, “[m]edia 
and marketing, far more than family or government, create and ma-
nipulate child and youth culture and are reshaping the ecology of 
childhood and youth.”59  In her view, “mass-media marketing” is “a po-
tentially destructive assault on children’s environment that we must 
strive to understand and attempt to regulate.”60  According to both 
Woodhouse and Karst, then, this type of activity between home and 
school presents a threat to family law’s traditional approach to child-
rearing and, at least for Woodhouse, a threat to childhood itself.  In 
response, Woodhouse calls for a new legal paradigm, grounded in de-
velopmental psychology, in which parents become partners with the 
state and encourage the “government’s role in preserving an ecologi-
cal environment that supports children’s healthy development.”61  
Karst, in contrast, is much less optimistic about the prospects of regu-
lation designed to bolster the socializing power of parents or the 
state.62
55 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 829 (2004) 
(“[L]egislatures, courts, and legal scholars have created the family law canon, and the 
family law canon has in turn shaped how these legal authorities and scholars think 
about family law, and how they teach their students and successors to view the field.”).
56 Karst, supra note 4, at 1002-11; Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 104-11.  Given the 
nuanced analyses of these industries by Professors Woodhouse and Karst, this Article 
will not focus on commercial spaces between home and school, but instead will focus 
on other spaces that have been ignored within family law scholarship.  For additional 
commentary on how children’s actions are influenced by advertisers, see Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Framing Public Interventions with Respect to Children as Parent-Empowering 12-13, 
(U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 925246, 2006), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=925246. 
57 Karst, supra note 4, at 1003. 
58 Id. at 1007. 
59 Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 92. 
60 Id. at 94-95. 
61 Id. at 165. 
62 See Karst, supra note 4, at 1004, 1028 (arguing that the power of law as a socializ-
ing force “is often an illusion”). 
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This recent work of Karst and Woodhouse is significant, in that it 
acknowledges important socializing forces family law previously has 
neglected, in large part because they are not attributable to either par-
ents or the state, at home or at school.  Nonetheless, the media and 
advertising industries are not the only socializing forces between 
home and school, nor are all such forces necessarily harmful to chil-
dren.  Therefore, an acknowledgment of childrearing between home 
and school need not always inspire calls for increased state regulation 
or sighs of helplessness.  Instead, an acknowledgment of all the types 
of childrearing between home and school can illustrate the diversity 
of this childrearing and highlight how, although ignored within family 
law, such childrearing has not always operated outside of the law’s 
reach. 
C.  Introducing the Boy Scouts 
The Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale,63 discussed in more detail in Part II below, repeatedly addressed 
the desires of the Boy Scouts to “instill[] its system of values in young 
people.”64  The case is unique in that it concerned the teaching of 
children, specifically boys, in a context unconnected to parents or the 
state, at locations other than home or school.  Thus, it does not fit 
within family law’s triangle paradigm, but it undoubtedly concerns 
childrearing.  Even so, the case has been viewed solely as a dispute be-
tween adults, having no relation to family law.  In fact, family law 
scholars have barely commented on Dale at all.  By leaving Dale to 
other legal scholars, family law scholars once again signal that child-
rearing performed between home and school, by neither parents nor 
the state, is insignificant or unworthy of legal attention.  An examina-
tion of the Court’s opinion reveals, however, that this is far from the 
case. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Dale that the Boy Scouts could le-
gitimately prevent James Dale, a gay man, from leading a troop of Boy 
Scouts in New Jersey, even though the Boy Scouts is considered a 
place of public accommodation under New Jersey law,65 and New Jer-
63 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
64 Id. at 644. 
65 Id. at 656-57 (noting that “New Jersey’s statutory definition of ‘[a] place of pub-
lic accommodation’ is extremely broad,” and has been applied not only to “clearly 
commercial” private entities, but also to “membership organizations such as the Boy 
Scouts”). 
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sey’s public accommodations law66 explicitly prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.67  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
had ruled in Dale’s favor, rejecting the Boy Scouts’s argument that it 
should be exempt from New Jersey’s public accommodations law be-
cause application of the law would violate the organization’s First 
Amendment right of expressive association.68  The United States Su-
preme Court reversed, however, in a five-to-four decision.69  The 
Court reached its holding on First Amendment expressive association 
grounds, concluding that Dale’s mere presence would infringe the 
Boy Scouts’s First Amendment right to express its desired message re-
garding sexuality.70  Although the Supreme Court’s analysis focused 
on the speaker of that message—the national Boy Scouts organiza-
tion—a closer look at the case reveals that the message would not have 
mattered but for its recipients:  the boys of the Boy Scouts.  Dale is thus 
a case about childrearing—more specifically, the socialization of 
boys—and who may make decisions about childrearing in one particu-
lar space between home and school. 
Granted, the Supreme Court did not affix the label of childrear-
ing to the activities at issue in Dale, nor did it mention the family at all.  
In fact, the Court barely even mentioned boys, the constitutive mem-
bers of the Boy Scouts.  Instead, the issue was framed as one pitting 
the rights of the group, the Boy Scouts, against the rights of James 
Dale.  But Dale was asserting his right to lead and teach a group of 
boys.  Dale thus sought recognition of a right to participate in the Boy 
Scouts’s childrearing activities in his New Jersey community. 
Commentators have found the Supreme Court’s decision in Dale 
puzzling as a matter of First Amendment expressive association doc-
trine.  The opinion seems at odds with the Court’s prior expressive as-
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2002). 
67 530 U.S. at 659.  Dale had grown up as a Boy Scout and began serving as an as-
sistant scoutmaster in college.  While at college, he also came out as gay and served as 
co-president of the school’s lesbian/gay alliance.  When Dale’s involvement in the 
group was mentioned in a newspaper article, the Boy Scouts removed Dale from his 
position as an assistant scoutmaster.  When Dale asked why, a local Boy Scouts execu-
tive wrote that the Boy Scouts “‘specifically forbid[s] membership to homosexuals.’”  
Id. at 644-45. 
68 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1228 (N.J. 1999). 
69 Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion and was joined by Jus-
tices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer dissented. 
70 530 U.S. at 653-59. 
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sociation cases, primarily Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,71 Board of Directors of Ro-
tary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,72 and New York State Club Ass’n 
v. City of New York,73 all of which applied state public accommodations 
laws to force groups to admit women as members.  Because the facts 
in those cases were similar to those in Dale, yet the Dale outcome so 
different, commentators have been left with doubts about the contin-
ued validity of past expressive association doctrine, and with questions 
about the substance and scope of any “new” expressive association 
doctrine which may have silently guided the Court’s analysis.74
71 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
72 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
73 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
74 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 601 (2001) (arguing that the Court effectively under-
mined its decision in Jaycees by allowing the Boy Scouts to define its expressive message 
during litigation, irrespective of evidentiary support and without judicial scrutiny); 
Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural:  Expressive Associations and the First 
Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1491-97 (2001) (tracing the move from the “old” to 
the “new” expressive association doctrine established in Dale); Nan D. Hunter, Accom-
modating the Public Sphere:  Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1603 (2001) 
(noting in Dale “a distressing willingness to abdicate the role of assessing the bona  
fides of an organization’s claim about the degree of harm that would be inflicted by an 
individual’s presence”); Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times:  Dale v. Boy Scouts of 
America and the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 
1821-26 (2002) (discussing the “remarkable degree of deference” afforded the Boy 
Scouts in Dale and the extent of the Court’s departure in that case from previous doc-
trine); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 816-17 
(2001) (arguing that Dale abandoned the established doctrine that “conduct law[s] of 
general applicability” do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny even where there is an 
expressive purpose to violate them). 
 Even commentators who support the outcome in Dale have questioned the Court’s 
application of the existing expressive association doctrine to reach that outcome.  See, 
e.g., David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 
83, 124 (2001) (“Dale would be a much less confusing opinion if the majority had bit-
ten the bullet and explicitly overruled Roberts.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional 
Perils of Moderation:  The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 120-22 (2000) (ar-
guing that Dale was too narrowly decided and that all private associations that are not 
in a monopoly position should be exempt from antidiscrimination laws); The Supreme 
Court—1999 Term:  Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 262 (2000) (“The Court could 
have found a more practically sound basis for its holding by considering whether the 
government may commandeer BSA’s expressive facilities as passive conduits for an 
ideological message the organization finds objectionable.”); see also Laurence H. Tribe, 
Disentangling Symmetries:  Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 656 (2001) 
(“Looked at strictly as a First Amendment case, Boy Scouts may be something of a 
stretch, or at least an anomaly.” (footnote omitted)).  Other commentators, however, 
have used the decision in Dale to examine problematic aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
past expressive association cases.  See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong 
with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 880 (2005) (“[T]he Jaycees approach 
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The outcome in Dale seems less puzzling, however, when one con-
siders the membership of the Boy Scouts.  Dale did not concern a so-
cial or business club consisting solely of adult members; rather, Dale 
concerned an organization made up of boys and those adults, primar-
ily men, who want to teach, lead, and mentor boys.  The Boy Scouts 
sought to exclude Dale based on the organization’s view that Dale’s 
mere presence as a gay man would contradict the messages that the 
Boy Scouts was attempting to impart to boys regarding issues of sexu-
ality.  At bottom, Dale is about boys and who may guide them on the 
road to becoming men. 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Dale emphasized this 
childrearing mission, but then relied on traditional expressive associa-
tion doctrine to reach their respective outcomes.75  The majority be-
gan its focus on childrearing by finding that 
the general mission of the Boy Scouts is clear:  “[T]o instill values in 
young people.”  The Boy Scouts seeks to instill these values by having its 
adult leaders spend time with the youth members, instructing and en-
gaging them in activities like camping, archery, and fishing.  During the 
time spent with the youth members, the scoutmasters and assistant 
scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy Scouts’ values—both expressly 
and by example.
76
Based on this factual finding, the majority then concluded that 
the Boy Scouts engages in expressive activity,77 and that Dale’s pres-
ence would “surely interfere” with that expression,78 because the Boy 
Scouts seeks to instill the values of heterosexuality, as opposed to ho-
mosexuality, and the First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts’s 
teaching-by-example method of expression.79  Given these conclu-
sions, the majority held that application of New Jersey’s public ac-
to the value of association is wrongly message-based and excessively outwardly fo-
cused.”). 
75 Shiffrin, supra note 74, at 881 (“By and large, it was taken for granted by all the 
Justices in Dale that the standard test for freedom of association claims applied.”). 
76 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649-50 (2000) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing the Boy Scouts of America mission statement). 
77 See id. at 650 (“It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit 
such a system of values engages in expressive activity.”). 
78 Id. at 654. 
79 See id. at 655-56 (“The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist 
in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different message from the 
presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with 
Boy Scouts policy.”). 
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commodations law in this case would significantly impair the Boy 
Scouts’s ability to impart its desired values to boys.80
The two dissenting opinions, by Justices Stevens and Souter, pri-
marily challenged the majority’s deference to the Boy Scouts’s own 
formulation of the values it seeks to impart to boys,81 and the major-
ity’s conclusion that Dale’s mere presence would convey a message 
about homosexuality.  Justice Stevens, in particular, emphasized that 
there is “no basis . . . to presume that a homosexual will be unable to 
comply with [the Boy Scouts’s] policy not to discuss sexual matters,” 82 
and he concluded that “[t]he only apparent explanation for the ma-
jority’s holding, then, is that homosexuals are simply so different from 
the rest of society that their presence alone—unlike any other indi-
vidual’s—should be singled out for special First Amendment treat-
ment.”83
The majority’s holding has some appeal under principles of ex-
pressive association; after all, views on sexuality are indeed a message.  
This appeal dissipates, however, when one examines why the Boy 
Scouts excluded Dale.  It was not because of anything Dale said as a 
80 Id. at 656.  The Court distinguished Jaycees and Rotary Club on the ground that 
requiring those groups to accept female members did not “materially interfere with 
the ideas [those groups] sought to express,” id. at 657, although those groups had also 
claimed that the inclusion of women would impair the messages they sought to convey.  
Id. at 657-58.  For example, the Rotary Club claimed that admitting women would de-
stroy an “‘aspect of fellowship . . . that is enjoyed by the male membership’” and hinder 
its ability “to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied cultures and social 
mores.”  Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541 (1987) 
(quoting and citing testimony of Rotary International’s General Secretary).  The Rotary 
Club and Jaycees Courts rejected such arguments, concluding that the relevant inquiry 
was whether admitting the undesired applicants would “impose[] any serious burdens” 
on the group’s “collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals.”  Roberts v. U.S. Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 626 (1984); Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548.  As Justice Brennan 
stated in Jaycees, admitting women did not require a “change in the Jaycees’ creed of 
promoting the interests of young men,” nor did it otherwise impede the organization’s 
“protected activities.”  468 U.S. at 627. 
81 530 U.S. at 665-78, 684-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens analyzed the 
Boy Scouts’s published guidance and policy statements, concluding that teaching 
about sexuality, and particularly teaching about the undesirability of homosexuality, 
was not “part of the group’s collective efforts to foster a belief.”  Id. at 677.  Accord-
ingly, in Justice Stevens’s view, the Boy Scouts could not point to a sincere policy 
against homosexuality, nor could it connect that policy to the group’s expressive activi-
ties.  Id. at 677-78.  Justice Souter more simply stated that his conclusion was based on 
the Boy Scouts’s “failure to make sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal ad-
vocacy, using the channels it customarily employs to state its message.”  Id. at 701 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 696. 
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Boy Scout or because of anything he said to his troop.  Nor was it be-
cause of anything he did as a Boy Scout or in front of his troop.  In-
deed, there was no evidence indicating that Dale’s troop members, or 
their parents, even knew that he was gay.84  Additionally, Dale testified 
that he had no intention of informing his troop of his sexuality or 
otherwise discussing sexuality.85
Despite these facts, the Boy Scouts asserted that it could exclude 
Dale because it found that his mere presence—not any speech or 
conduct—conflicted with the Boy Scouts’s desired message and its 
teach-by-example philosophy.  The majority of the Court accepted this 
explanation, holding that Dale’s silent presence infringed the Boy 
Scouts’s speech.  The Court’s holding thus diverges from other First 
Amendment cases, where a particular individual’s speech conflicted 
with the group’s message.86
Given the Court’s emphasis on the Boy Scouts’s childrearing role, 
however, it is not surprising that Dale differs from other First Amend-
ment cases.  Some commentators have concluded that homophobia 
explains the Dale majority’s unique approach.87  But Dale did not con-
84 See id. at 697 (“[I]n this case there is no evidence that the young Scouts in Dale’s 
troop, or members of their families, were even aware of his sexual orientation.”). 
85 As Justice Stevens’s dissent stressed:  “Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he 
did not distribute any factsheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message.”  Id. 
at 694-95; see also Tribe, supra note 74, at 650 (“[T]he inclusion of openly gay scout 
leaders cannot be assumed to result in infiltrating the Scouts with individuals inter-
ested in undermining the group from within, radically changing the Scouts’ Oath, or 
modifying the Scouts’ other defining documents.”). 
86 For example, Dale is distinguishable from Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), because Dale, unlike the parade 
participants carrying banners in Hurley, was not identifying himself as gay or otherwise 
communicating about his sexuality. 
87 See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 74, at 613 (“The conservative majority . . . 
reinforces the sense that Dale is really about how these five Justices feel about homosexu-
ality.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust:  How Courts Can Support Democracy 
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1291-92 (2005) (discussing the influ-
ence of “antigay prejudice” on judicial decision making); Hunter, supra note 74, at 1608 
(“[T]he Court impliedly finds that almost any openly gay or lesbian person is radioac-
tive.”); Arthur S. Leonard, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:  The “Gay Rights Activist” as Con-
stitutional Pariah, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 27, 32 (2001) (stating that Dale may be “yet 
another example of the ‘gay exception’ to the U.S. Constitution”).  But see William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance:  Judicial Review To Lower the Stakes of 
Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1074 n.197 (2004) [hereinafter Eskridge, Law-
rence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance] (“Once Lawrence and Romer replace Hardwick as the rele-
vant background, however, Hurley and (even) Dale can be read as signals that the Court 
will protect both gay people and traditionalists where the Constitution requires.”); Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1937-38 (2001) 
(arguing that Justice Stevens’s dissent in Dale was motivated by religious bigotry). 
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cern homosexuality in the abstract or in business-oriented social 
groups such as the Jaycees.  Rather, the Court considered whether a 
group that instills values in boys could exclude homosexual men as 
mentors and leaders because the group considers homosexuality to be 
incompatible with masculinity and “the good life.”88  As such, the 
Court confronted not just homosexuality, but the prospect of gay men 
equipping boys with the tools of manhood. 
Dale is thus about a very particular type of speech, childrearing by 
example, which is difficult to distinguish from childrearing itself.89  
The Court had to consider, in essence, who may teach children by ex-
ample free from state intrusion.  Given this context, the outcome of 
Dale implicitly may be more about childrearing—and the deference 
traditionally accorded to certain types of childrearing—than about 
speech in general.  Part II of this Article examines Dale from this fam-
ily law perspective. 
II.  A FAMILY LAW READING OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE 
Childrearing, like other family functions, has long been protected 
by notions of family privacy and autonomy.  This protection has its 
origins in the nineteenth-century belief that life was properly divided 
88 See Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf:  Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 271, 318 (2003) (observing 
that the Boy Scouts attempt to “construct[] masculinity by excluding sissies and thus 
openly gay men”); cf. Stephen Clark, Judicially Straight?  Boy Scouts v. Dale and the Miss-
ing Scalia Dissent, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 589 (2003) (stating that James Dale was not 
“the kind of dsytopian exemplar of gender-rigidified heterosexual mating that the Boy 
Scouts desired in its role models”).  The Boy Scouts is not alone in its view of homo-
sexuality as incompatible with masculinity.  For example, the Ninth Circuit has con-
fronted, and rejected, assertions of that view in several employment discrimination 
cases.  See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (concluding that co-workers’ treatment of the 
plaintiff, a homosexual man, constituted “actionable gender stereotyping harassment” 
because the co-workers treated the plaintiff “like a woman”); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (agreeing that “a man who is dis-
criminated against for acting too feminine” has a valid claim under Title VII). 
89 In this way, Dale can be seen as similar to those custody cases that examine 
whether children need role models of the same sex in order to internalize “proper” or 
“healthy” gender and sexual performances.  See, e.g., In re F.W., 870 A.2d 82, 87 (D.C. 
2005) (“The fact that petitioners are a same-sex female couple cannot, in itself, be pre-
sumed contrary to [a male child’s] best interests.”); Levin v. Levin, 836 P.2d 529, 532-
33 (Idaho 1992) (addressing a mother’s argument that having a same-sex role model 
was in her daughter’s best interests); Sandlin v. Sandlin, 906 So. 2d 39, 41-42 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2004) (affirming the decision to place a son in the custody of his father and a 
daughter in the custody of her mother because of the respective needs of “a strong fa-
ther figure” and a “mother’s guidance and advice”). 
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between the public and private spheres.90  Pursuant to this ideology, 
childrearing came to be seen as a private activity, to be performed in 
the privacy of the home.91  The state intervened in childrearing only 
to the extent necessary to protect children’s welfare in situations 
where the state thought parents were defaulting on their duties,92 or 
to educate future citizens by requiring school attendance and setting 
policies for public and, to a lesser extent, private schools.93  This allo-
cation of authority has remained to the present day, and family law 
scholarship about the parent-child relationship takes it as a given, fo-
cusing almost exclusively on when the state should be able to trump 
parental prerogatives, and when parents should be able to influence 
state educational policies. 
This legal treatment of the childrearing function ignores the fact 
that childrearing has never been performed exclusively at home and 
school, but also occurs in other spaces, such as Boy Scouts meetings.  
As discussed in more detail below, however, the holding in Dale can be 
90 See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD:  “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN 
NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 57 (1977) (“In an intriguing development in language 
usage in the early nineteenth century, ‘home’ became synonymous with ‘retirement’ 
or ‘retreat’ from the world at large.”); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:  
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 17 (1985) (discussing how the 
nineteenth-century ideology of family governance glorified the separation of the re-
publican family and the state); Olsen, supra note 47, at 1498-1500 (describing how the 
nineteenth-century family was viewed as a refuge from the market); Reva B. Siegel, 
“The Rule of Love”:  Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2147 
(1996) (“Countless nineteenth-century accounts of the home depict the family as fun-
damentally distinct from other spheres of social life . . . .”).  Prior to the industrial era, 
the concepts of family, state, and market were more fluid and overlapping.  For discus-
sions of this interrelationship, see, for example, COTT, supra, at 59–62; Hila Keren, Can 
Separate Be Equal?  Intimate Economic Exchange and the Cost of Being Special, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 19, 20-23 (2006). 
91 Prior to the nineteenth century, children often lived outside of their parents’ 
homes.  See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY:  ESSAYS ON RELIGION & 
DOMESTIC LIFE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 28-29, 36-38 (1944) (describ-
ing how many children lived in apprenticeships and other nonfamily situations during 
the seventeenth century).  For discussions of how childhood came to be experienced 
primarily within the family home, see STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC 
REVOLUTIONS:  A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 58-60 (1988) (describing 
how “a new conception of childhood began to emerge” in 1830, pursuant to which “a 
growing number of parents, particularly in the Northeastern middle class, began to 
keep their sons and daughters home well into their teens and even their twenties”); 
WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, HOME:  A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 48-49, 77 (1986) (describ-
ing how, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, children of the bourgeois 
began living at home during their school years). 
92 See infra notes 115-119 and accompanying text. 
93 See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text. 
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read as quite consistent with family law doctrine that generally pro-
tects parents’ prerogatives to rear their children free from state intru-
sion, and, in particular, protects parents’ right to exclude whomever 
they wish from the family home.94  Dale thus suggests that notions of 
family privacy could attach to childrearing even when it is performed 
outside of the home by organizations that do not look like the tradi-
tional parent, but that function as parental surrogates.  The space be-
tween home and school is thereby enveloped by an extension of the 
privacy of the home, leaving school as the sole domain where the 
state’s interests in childrearing may trump private childrearing deci-
sions. 
Alternatively, however, the space between home and school could 
be viewed as an extension of school, confining parental prerogatives to 
the privacy of the home.  From this perspective, parents still have a 
right, at home, to impart to their children whatever values they 
choose.  Once outside the home, however, the state has more power.  
The state may compel school attendance and control public school 
curricula and policy.95  Parents, consistent with their constitutional 
and common law rights to direct the upbringing of their children, 
may choose to send their children to private (as opposed to public) 
schools,96 or even choose to home school.97  These choices, however, 
are costly—in time, or money, or both.  Moreover, even if parents are 
willing and able to bear the costs, parental choice does not insulate 
private schools and home schools from state regulation.  Most perti-
nently, private schools are subject to state antidiscrimination laws:  the 
state interest in preventing discrimination trumps any right that par-
ents may have to use private schools to impart the virtues of discrimi-
94 Many commentators have explored parents’ seemingly exclusive right to make 
childrearing decisions.  See, e.g., Buss, supra note 3, at 29 (discussing the traditional “ex-
clusion of other private parties competing with parents for some or all control over a 
child’s upbringing”).  The state may sometimes mandate third-party visitation that is in 
the child’s best interest, but such visitation does not entail entry into the home, and 
the Supreme Court has held that states must give considerable deference to parents’ 
judgment before ordering such visitation, even when it occurs outside of the home.  
See David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed:  Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1163-69 (2001) (discussing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 
and examining the Court’s consideration of parental autonomy interests in the context 
of child visitation). 
95 See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text (discussing cases illustrating the 
state’s broad authority to make education-related decisions). 
96 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
97 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 15, at 34 (noting that all states permit parents to 
home school their children, so long as they meet state requirements). 
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nation to their children.98  Analogizing the Boy Scouts to schools thus 
provides support for an alternative holding in Dale.  The Sections be-
low explore these two possibilities. 
A.  Extending Home:  The Boy Scouts as Parental Surrogate 
Traditionally, courts have considered the rearing of boys, as well as 
girls, in the context of determining the boundaries of parents’ authority 
to direct the upbringing of their children.  Obviously, the Boy Scouts is 
not a parent.  Nonetheless, throughout the majority opinion in Dale, 
the Supreme Court focused on the rights of the Boy Scouts as an entity 
under the First Amendment, not on the rights of the Boy Scouts’s 
members.99  This approach represented a shift from the Court’s prior 
approach in Jaycees, which primarily considered whether requiring the 
Jaycees to admit women, pursuant to Minnesota’s public accommoda-
tions law, would affect the expression of the group’s members.100
The Dale majority did not provide any explanation for this shift.  
That may have been because it was obvious that the Boy Scouts’s 
members, as minors, cannot make associational decisions on their 
own, but instead may associate only at the direction of their parents or 
other legal guardians.  This reality did not require the Dale Court to 
analyze the rights of the Boy Scouts as an entity, however.  Instead, the 
Court could have analyzed the associational rights of the parents who 
98 See infra text accompanying notes 138-143 (discussing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 
U.S. 160 (1976)—which held that private schools are not exempt from 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1981 and therefore must admit African-American students—and emphasizing the 
fact that private schools are subject to Title VII). 
99 See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 74, at 609 (“Simply put, the Court’s failing in 
Dale was its determining the expressive message of the group without any considera-
tion of the views or rights of the members.”); Farber, supra note 74, at 1494-96 
(“[E]arlier cases often focused on the participation of members in the association.  
The focus in recent cases such as Dale, however, is on the rights of the organization as 
an entity, not on the rights of its individual members.”).  In dissent, Justice Stevens 
briefly considered the views of the members of the Boy Scouts, whether they be boys or 
their parents, when he emphasized that neither the scouts in Dale’s troop nor their 
families were aware of Dale’s sexual orientation.  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640, 697 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  During the rest of his dissent, however, Jus-
tice Stevens, like the majority, focused on the national leadership of the Boy Scouts, 
thereby emphasizing the views of the entity as opposed to the views of the entity’s 
members. 
100 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); see also id. at 623 (“We are 
persuaded that Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against 
its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may 
have on the male members’ associational freedoms.” (emphasis added)).  For criticism of 
this focus on members, see Shiffrin, supra note 74, at 864-69. 
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permit their sons to join the Boy Scouts.101  That analysis, consistent 
with Jaycees, would have considered the messages that the parents 
sought to convey by permitting, and even encouraging, their sons to 
join the Boy Scouts.  The case’s outcome may not have changed,102 but 
the approach would have been consistent with existing expressive as-
sociation doctrine. 
That the Dale Court chose not to analyze the associational rights of 
the parents of the Boy Scouts could indicate that the Court saw the 
Boy Scouts as a particular type of entity:  an entity functioning as a pa-
rental surrogate.  Parents entrust their sons to the Boy Scouts, delegat-
ing a portion of their childrearing authority to the organization.  The 
Boy Scouts may thus be more than an entity comprised of parents as 
members, each with their own views.  Instead, the Boy Scouts could be 
seen as an entity that has partially assumed the authority of its mem-
bers to rear their children, in effect becoming a parental surrogate.103  
Just as a parent is (or attempts to be) the final arbiter of the lessons 
her children heed, the Boy Scouts is the final arbiter of the lessons to 
which boys are exposed during their time with the Boy Scouts organi-
zation.  Once parents choose to delegate a portion of their childrear-
ing authority to the organization and permit their sons to remain af-
filiated with the organization, their own personal views become 
subordinate—or even irrelevant. 
The Dale Court’s deference to the Boy Scouts’s message and teach-
by-example approach supports this view of the Boy Scouts as a paren-
tal surrogate.  When childrearing takes place within the home, par-
ents generally have discretion to impart to their children whatever 
values they please and to exclude anyone they choose.104  As discussed 
in more detail below,105 this protection of parents’ childrearing au-
101 Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 74, at 883 (asking “whether the proper characterization 
of the Boy Scouts is as an association of children or as a mixed association of adults 
and children”). 
102 It is unknown whether the parents in New Jersey supported the Boy Scouts’s 
view about the suitability of gay troop leaders.  As discussed above, the parents of the 
boys in James Dale’s troop did not know that Dale was gay.  See supra text accompany-
ing notes 84-85. 
103 For a discussion of other potential parental surrogates, see Janet L. Dolgin, The 
Constitution as Family Arbiter:  A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 395-404 
(2002) (including grandparents and “de facto” parents as parental surrogates); cf. Par-
ham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-08 (1979) (holding that parents have the right to commit 
a child to a state mental institution against the child’s wishes, so long as a “neutral fact-
finder,” such as a doctor, agrees). 
104 See supra text accompanying notes 90-94. 
105 See infra notes 112-126 and accompanying text. 
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thority has both constitutional and common law origins.  In the New 
Jersey courts, the Boy Scouts directly appealed to one strand of this 
protection of parental authority, arguing that the Boy Scouts’s na-
tional organization, like families, could exclude Dale pursuant to the 
First Amendment right of intimate association.  The New Jersey Su-
preme Court ultimately rejected the intimate association argument, 
holding that the Boy Scouts’s “large size, nonselectivity, inclusive 
rather than exclusive purpose, and practice of inviting or allowing 
nonmembers to attend meetings, establish that the organization is not 
‘sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection’ 
under the freedom of intimate association.”106  The Dale majority did 
not review that part of the state court’s decision.107
One commentator has argued that Boy Scout troops and dens, as 
opposed to the national Boy Scouts organization, do in fact function 
as “an extension of the boys’ families” and therefore should be pro-
tected by the right to intimate association.108  Indeed, if one considers 
the individual groups in which the Boy Scouts functions—the troops 
and dens, consisting of anywhere from eight to twenty boys—then the 
Boy Scouts organization shares at least four characteristics of many 
families.  First, like families, the troops are relatively small groups.  
Second, minors are the focus of both groups.109  Third, the Boy Scouts 
seeks to instill values in young people, a primary family function.110  
106 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1221 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Bd. of 
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l. v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)). 
107 In dissent, Justice Stevens dismissed the intimate association argument as “im-
possible.”  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
108 See John C. O’Quinn, “How Solemn Is the Duty of the Mighty Chief”:  Mediating the 
Conflict of Rights in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S.Ct 2446 (2000), 24 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 319, 357 (2000).  The Boy Scouts even use some family terminology, assign-
ing, for example, “den mothers” to each troop.  See Poirer, supra note 88, at 277 n.17 
(briefly discussing women’s roles in the Boy Scouts). 
109 Of course, minors are not found in all families, nor does state recognition of 
families hinge on the presence of minors.  Even so, family law, as well as the broader 
culture, often assumes that (at least heterosexual) adults will become parents and thus 
will focus some amount of their attention on their children.  See Dolgin, supra note 18, 
at 362 (“[C]hildren remain central to understandings of family for both traditionalists 
and modernists.”); cf. Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 378-79 (2006) (upholding a 
ban on same-sex marriage largely because “marriage was instituted to address the fact 
that sexual contact between a man and a woman naturally can result in pregnancy and 
childbirth”).  For a discussion and critique of this “repronormativity,” see Katherine M. 
Franke, Theorizing Yes:  An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 
183-97 (2001). 
110 See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 20, at 434-35 (discussing how parents leave their im-
prints on children during children’s development into fully realized citizens); Peggy 
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Fourth, both the Boy Scouts and families allegedly seek to instill values 
about gender and sex, aspects of identity that are foundational to state 
definitions of marriage and the family.111  When one considers all four 
characteristics together—when the Boy Scouts is seen as a series of 
small groups made up of children and mentors performing a function 
traditionally performed by the family about subjects that are at the 
core of state definitions of family—it is plausible to conclude that the 
Boy Scouts constitutes a family-like intimate association. 
It is not necessary, however, for the Boy Scouts to constitute an in-
timate association in order to enjoy the protections that attach to pa-
rental childrearing.  Protection of parental authority is not grounded 
solely in First Amendment notions of intimate association.  Indeed, 
most protections of parental authority sound in privacy rather than in 
speech or association.  Constitutional rights to be left alone in one’s 
Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values:  The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1348, 1371 (1994) (“For parents and other guardians, civil freedom brings a right to 
choose and propagate values.”). 
111 See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:  A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 3 
(2d prtg. 2002) (describing how state laws concerning marriage “can shape the gender 
order”).  This does not mean, however, that states encourage parents and children to 
talk about sex, or that states even permit parents to encourage their children to engage 
in sexual activities.  For example, children ordinarily may not consent to their own 
medical care, but most states carve out exceptions that allow children to consent to 
their own care for the diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and 
pregnancy (except, in most states, when it comes to abortion).  See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. 
ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW:  DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRAC-
TICE 769-70 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that “[m]ost states” have “limited medical emanci-
pation statutes”).   A common justification for these exceptions is that children will be 
too fearful or embarrassed to discuss these matters with their parents and, conse-
quently, would not seek care if parental consent were required.  Id.  The state there-
fore does nothing to encourage discussions between parents and children and, in fact, 
provides the means for children to avoid them.  Similarly, many states require parental 
consent or notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, but the minor must be 
provided with the option to seek a judicial bypass if she is sufficiently mature and does 
not wish to inform her parents.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).   
 On the other side of the coin, children can face charges under state statutory rape 
laws even if they discussed their decision to engage in sexual activity with their parents 
and the parents gave their blessings.  See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. 
HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 142-46 (2d ed. 2004) (detailing state “age 
of consent” laws (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Moreover, parents who have 
consented to their children’s sexual experimentation have faced criminal charges.  See, 
e.g., Sharif Durhams, DA Prosecutes Mom Who Gave Son Condoms, MILWAUKEE J.-
SENTINEL, Jan. 15, 2001, available at http://www2.jsonline.com/news/metro/jan01/ 
condom15011401a.asp (reporting that felony charges were brought against a mother 
in Sauk County, Wisconsin, for permitting her thirteen-year-old son to engage in sex-
ual intercourse with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend). 
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home112 and to direct the upbringing of one’s child pursuant to the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment113 converge to give 
parents almost complete authority over childrearing conducted within 
the home.  As the Supreme Court stated in 1968, “constitutional in-
terpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to au-
thority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children 
is basic in the structure of our society.”114  Parents are thus protected 
from intrusions by the state in many contexts, although the protection 
is not unlimited.  Most notably, states may intervene in the parent-
child relationship to further children’s welfare in four general ways:  
intervening when there is abuse or neglect, requiring school atten-
dance, limiting child labor outside of the home, and subjecting chil-
dren who violate the law to juvenile or adult criminal court.115  Other-
wise, parents have the right to direct the upbringing of their children, 
including the right to control the messages their children receive 
while under their care. 
112 First articulated as early as the 1920s, this right has been reaffirmed on several 
occasions.  See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (describing the “right to be let alone” as the “right most valued by civilized 
men”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (deeming statutes criminalizing 
the “private possession of obscene material” unconstitutional while upholding the 
right of states to regulate the distribution of pornography); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 
394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (describing the home as “the sacred 
retreat to which families repair for their privacy and their daily way of living”); Carey v. 
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (reaffirming the value of “[p]reserving the sanctity of 
the home”). 
113 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t cannot 
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (“[T]he 
values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their chil-
dren in their early and formative years have a high place in our society.”); Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the right “of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (discussing the right to “bring up chil-
dren”); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that parents have 
the right to “indoctrinate children” and to choose their children’s social companions).  
But see id. at 91-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to recognize a “theory of unenu-
merated parental rights”). 
114 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). 
115 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (stating that “the state 
has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affect-
ing the child’s welfare” and enumerating the first three exceptions to parental author-
ity described above); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (“If his parents default in effec-
tively performing their custodial functions—that is, if the child is ‘delinquent’—the 
state may intervene.”).
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Although broad, this parental privacy right may not seem broad 
enough to encompass the childrearing activities of the Boy Scouts.  
The right is frequently viewed as attaching to parents as individuals, 
not to the family as a whole.  Parents are endowed with individual le-
gal rights that can be balanced against the interests of the state.116  
Even when functioning as a parental surrogate, the Boy Scouts looks 
like a group, not an individual.  The dispute over Dale’s participation 
in the group only highlights the fact that the Boy Scouts is not like an 
individual with constitutional rights. 
The Boy Scouts’s activities could still be protected by notions of 
family privacy, however, because such privacy has also been extended 
to the family as an entity.  At common law, privacy attached to the 
family as an entity, not to the individual members of the family, and it 
encompassed virtually all family functions.117  This entity-based privacy 
has also been recognized as a matter of constitutional law,118 creating 
two complementary and converging sources of family privacy.  Pursu-
ant to this broader, entity-based conception of privacy, the state regu-
lates the entity only upon formation—that is, in defining marriage, 
parenthood, and the family itself—and in instances of what the state 
116 See Dolgin, supra note 18, at 382 (describing both Meyer and Pierce as “premised 
on a deep-seated fear of state control and on a presumption that parents enjoy a natu-
ral right of control over their children”); John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the 
Due Process Clause:  An Essay on the Supreme Court’s Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 
770 (1978) (“[I]f there are limits on what the state may do, it is because those who 
have primary control over the child have an interest, protected by the due process 
clause, in making decisions on the child’s behalf.”). 
117 See Dolgin, supra note 18, at 347 (“The law, reflecting the larger society, long 
presumed the autonomy of the family unit . . . .”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy 
Outside of the Natural Family:  The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 966 (1991) 
(“The common law privacy doctrine is not an individualized concept . . . it attaches to 
the entity of the family, not to the individuals that compose it.”); Fineman, supra note 
49, at 1212-15 (describing cases that “illustrate the contours of the common law doc-
trine of family privacy”); Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORD- 
HAM L. REV. 31, 55 (2006) (describing how privacy historically “enable[d] the family, 
under male authority, to function as a distinct unit within society”). 
118 See Dailey, supra note 49, at 963 (“[S]ince the early part of this century, the fam-
ily has been accorded constitutional protection independent of the liberties enjoyed by 
its individual members.”); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition:  From Griswold to 
Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1543-46 (1994) (discussing how the marital 
unit as a whole was protected in Griswold, evoking common law notions of family pri-
vacy in a case about constitutional privacy, but in Eisenstadt, the protection was shifted 
to the individuals involved in the sexual relationship, reflecting individual notions of 
family privacy); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (recognizing, in a case 
litigated under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, that the family is “a 
unit with broad parental authority over minor children”). 
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perceives to be family breakdown, such as divorce or custody disputes, 
or in cases of abuse or neglect.119  In the absence of such breakdown, 
most families, but not all,120 are accorded privacy by being placed 
largely outside of the law’s reach.121  The entity-based privacy right 
119 See Fineman, supra note 49, at 1209 (noting that “the state is perceived as hav-
ing a role only in the case of family default”); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Genera-
tion:  A Feminist Approach to Children’s Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 7 (1986) (“Public 
power becomes relevant only in exceptional circumstances, when parents default.”).  
The state may also intervene when a parent dies, which could be viewed as the ultimate 
form of default.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 116 (7th 
ed. 2005) (discussing circumstances under which courts appoint “guardians of the per-
son” for children when their parents die).  
120 Families often are not accorded privacy when the state employs more expan-
sive, and more questionable, definitions of family breakdown.  For example, Dorothy 
Roberts has illustrated how poor and African-American children are more likely to be 
removed from their homes by the state than any other group of children.  Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Is There Justice in Children’s Rights?:  The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Pol-
icy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 125-26 (1999).  Roberts effectively ties this removal rate to 
stereotypes of African-American parents, rather than objective assessments of abuse.  
Id. at 131.  Martha Fineman has similarly illustrated how single mothers, particularly 
those who are poor and receiving direct financial assistance from the state, are de-
prived of entity-based privacy.  Fineman, supra note 117, at 958-59; see also Naomi R. 
Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225, 1243 (1999) (“A family’s 
dependence on public aid has typically meant forgoing otherwise applicable privacy 
rights . . . .”); Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children:  Sustaining the Family’s Place in 
Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1724-26 (2000) (book review) (discussing 
studies indicating that children are most often removed from their home because of 
poverty, rather than physical abuse).  For a brief historical discussion of how some 
families have been more protected by family privacy than others, see Rutherford, supra 
note 19, at 634-35 (observing that “[g]ood families,” those consisting of married par-
ents and their natural children, “received nearly absolute protection” from state inter-
vention, “while bad families,” those following other models, “had virtually none”). 
121 The primary exceptions to this regime of entity-based privacy are state-
mandated medical tests for newborns and vaccinations for children.  See, e.g., Douglas 
County v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Neb. 2005) (mandating metabolic testing for 
newborns despite parental objections on religious grounds). 
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that protects the family thus goes beyond individual protections,122 
removing the family as an entity from the zone of state power.123
Given the dependence of children, at least young ones, on their 
parents, this entity-based privacy usually amounts to parental auton-
omy—the right of parents to speak for their children and to make de-
cisions about their upbringing, free from state intrusion.124  As before, 
122 Indeed, entity-based family privacy is often reined in by the constitutional 
rights of individuals, because those individual rights can be invoked against other fam-
ily members.  See Dailey, supra note 49, at 1019 (“Under the doctrine of individual pri-
vacy, the state has a basis from which it may penetrate the intimate family unit.”); 
David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 481 (noting “the 
possibility that constitutional privacy will be invoked by one family member against an-
other in intrafamily disputes”).  State laws permitting unilateral no-fault divorce also 
could be seen as providing individuals with the tools to overcome entity-based family 
privacy.  Cf. GROSSBERG, supra note 90, at 29-30 (describing how, in the nineteenth 
century, the importance given to entity-based privacy meant that conflicts between in-
dividuals and families were generally resolved in favor of the family). 
123 See Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:  Some Reserva-
tions About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”, 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 617 (describing 
common law privacy as “plenary,” meaning that parental power “prevail[s] over the 
claims of the state, other outsiders, and the children themselves unless there is some 
compelling justification for interference”); Rutherford, supra note 19, at 631 (stating 
that, traditionally, “[t]he inherent value placed on family unity meant that courts were 
reluctant to intervene in family affairs on behalf of individuals”). 
124 Because entity-based privacy exempts families from state power only, it does 
little to protect vulnerable family members, particularly children, from internal family 
disputes or other displays of power.  See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Fam-
ily Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1174-80 (discussing how family privacy historically rein-
forced husbands’ authority over their wives and children).  Thus, children can be ad-
versely affected by the legal exemptions that result from entity-based family privacy.  See 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1247, 1255 (1999) (arguing that preventing “state intervention in a ‘unit’ composed of 
members of unequal power . . . means that the dominant member is free to engage in 
clearly (although not grossly) wrongful conduct while the dependent members are 
compelled to suffer it”); cf. Dolgin, supra note 103, at 346 (“[A]n evolutionary shift to-
ward the recognition of adults within families as autonomous individuals became revo-
lutionary in the last decades of the twentieth century.  Society did not, however, com-
parably reconstruct its understanding of children, and it still views them as dependant 
and vulnerable.” (footnotes omitted)).   
 Moreover, constitutional notions of privacy rarely endow children with rights that 
can be invoked against their parents.  See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights and 
the Problem of Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 810-15 (1999) (attempting to an-
swer the question:  “But how can the Supreme Court have held that children have 
autonomy-based rights in the midst of a legal setting that supposes that children are 
obliged to accept parental and governmental control regarding health, education, 
housing, and the like?”).  Notable exceptions include the rights of adolescents, without 
parental consent, to obtain contraception, Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 
678, 693-702 (1977) (plurality opinion), and to seek an abortion upon a judicial find-
ing of sufficient maturity, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); see also Garvey, 
supra note 116, at 789-805 (discussing Bellotti and Carey and exploring possible reasons 
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this autonomy is tempered by the state’s interest in protecting and 
educating future citizens.125  Parents must therefore send their chil-
dren to school, or create a school within their home, and must abide 
by legitimate educational requirements imposed by the state.  Once 
out of school and within the home, however, parents are outside of 
the zone of state power.  Parents are thus free to impart to their chil-
dren whatever values they please and to exclude anyone they choose 
from the family home.126
The Boy Scouts, as an entity engaged in childrearing, could ar-
guably be entitled to similar autonomy.  Once parents decide to dele-
gate a portion of their childrearing authority to the Boy Scouts, then 
the Boy Scouts may, under this reasoning, make determinations, free 
from state intervention, about who may rear the children under its 
care.  Indeed, Dale could be read as suggesting that the state should 
defer to childrearing decisions even when childrearing is performed 
outside of the home, by organizations that do not look like the tradi-
tional family, but which function as parental surrogates.  This family 
law analysis could provide the majority opinion in Dale with some 
much needed coherence.127
One objection to such an analysis is that courts have traditionally 
recognized parental authority with respect to household and educa-
tional matters only.  Most notably, the Supreme Court held in Prince v. 
Massachusetts that parental prerogatives did not trump state interests 
for granting these rare rights to minors in the contexts of contraception and abor-
tion).  Minors may also seek emancipation from their parents as a matter of state law.  
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7120 (West 2003). 
125 See Hafen, supra note 123, at 625 (“The common law and constitutional devel-
opments concerning parental rights are mutually reinforcing and arrive at the same 
basic posture—children should be subject to the custody and control of their natural 
parents until the parents’ conduct falls below the minimum standards established [by 
the state].”). 
126 Perhaps most notably, parents may even exclude a child’s grandparents.  
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000). 
127 To my knowledge, other scholars have not explicitly analyzed Dale along these 
entity-based family privacy lines.  For analyses that are close, see Eskridge, Lawrence’s 
Jurisprudence of Tolerance, supra note 87, at 1075-76 (reading Dale as telling traditionalists 
that  “gay people [cannot] do bad things to you,” and that “[y]our youth group is a 
safe place for you to express and inculcate your values, and it goes without saying that 
your home, your church, your parochial school, your other normative associations are 
all enclaves where the state cannot impose politically correct or progay values on 
you”); Shiffrin, supra note 74, at 885-86 (stating that “[t]he best case for recognizing a 
strong association right in Dale is to think of the Boy Scouts as an association of parents 
and their children, one that involves the participation of other adults to promote its 
purposes,” but relying primarily on the First Amendment to support that claim). 
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in upholding a state law prohibiting children from distributing reli-
gious literature on street corners, even when the child in question did 
so with her guardian’s permission.128  The traditional focus on home 
and school in considerations of parents’ rights has led some judges to 
limit parental authority to those spaces.  This limitation may be due to 
the fact that analyses of parental rights often consider the parents’ in-
dividual rights only.  For example, in rejecting parents’ challenge to a 
local curfew law, the D.C. Circuit stated: 
[I]nsofar as a parent can be thought to have a fundamental right, as 
against the state, in the upbringing of his or her children, that right is 
focused on the [parent’s] control of the home and the [parent’s] inter-
est in controlling, if he or she wishes, the formal education of chil-
dren.
129
A broader, entity-based conception of family privacy supports a 
different conclusion.  For example, a concurring judge in the same 
D.C. Circuit opinion stated: 
[A] parent’s stake in the rearing of his or her child surely extends be-
yond the front door of the family residence and even beyond the school 
classroom. . . . [P]arents throughout our history . . . have imposed re-
strictions on their children’s dating habits, driving, movie selections, 
part-time jobs, and places to visit, and . . . have permitted, paid for, and 
supported their children’s activities in sports programs, summer camps, 
tutorial counseling, college selection, and scores of other such activities, 
all arising outside of the family residence and school classroom.
130
The Dale holding could similarly be read to indicate that child-
rearing will be protected from state intrusion even when it occurs out-
side of the home.  Moreover, Dale also could be read as extending that 
protection to parental surrogates.  Privacy follows the function of the 
entity, not its form.  Under this interpretation, notions of family pri-
vacy and parental authority are expanded to protect outsourced child-
rearing in the spaces between home and school.  As such, these spaces 
are enveloped by an extension of the privacy of the home. 
128 321 U.S. 158, 167-70 (1944). 
129 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en 
banc) (plurality opinion). 
130 Id. at 549-50 (Edwards, J., concurring); see also id. at 550 (“The [Supreme] 
Court has never limited its definition of parental rights to include only the right to su-
pervise activities that take place literally inside the home or literally inside the class-
room.  Indeed, such a limitation is implausible.”). 
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B.  Extending School:  Considering the State’s Interests 
Childrearing between home and school need not be viewed as an 
extension of the childrearing performed by parents within the home.  
Another approach is to view childrearing between home and school as 
an extension of school, confining parental prerogatives (and those of 
their surrogates) to the privacy of the home.  Notions of family privacy 
are tempered by the state’s interest in educating future citizens.  If 
this interest is predominant in the school setting, it also could govern 
the spaces between home and school. 
In the school context, parents still have a right, at home, to im-
part to their children whatever values they choose.  That right does 
not extend into school, however.  Because the state has an interest  
in educating future citizens, parents must send their children to 
school,131 and parents are given no opportunity, beyond electing local 
school officials, to dictate how public schools teach their children.  
Those officials—not children’s parents—determine issues such as 
public school curricula and requirements,132 student disciplinary pro-
131 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)  (“There is no doubt as to the 
power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose 
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.”); Prince, 321 
U.S. at 166 (“Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as 
parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance . . . .”); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always re-
garded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance 
which should be diligently promoted.”). 
132 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-83 (1986) (stating that 
a legitimate objective of public education is “‘inculcat[ing] fundamental values neces-
sary to the maintenance of a democratic political system’” (quoting Ambach v. Nor-
wick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979))); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395-
96 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Whether it is the school curriculum, the hours of the school day, 
school discipline, the timing and content of examinations, the individuals hired to 
teach at the school, the extracurricular activities offered at the school or, as here, a 
dress code, these issues of public education are generally ‘committed to the control of 
state and local authorities.’” (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975))); Lee-
baert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that parents’ right to di-
rect the upbringing of their children does not include “the right to tell public schools 
what to teach or what not to teach” their children); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro 
City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a high school may re-
quire community service despite parents’ objections); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. 
Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 462 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 
68 F.3d 525, 533-41 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that parents have no right to control or 
modify sex education curriculum that emphasizes sexual pleasure). 
 The state’s role in determining school curricula and requirements extends to de-
termining which students are eligible for school sports.  See Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d 
1027, 1028, 1029 (Former 5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (upholding a rule that prohibited high 
school students from participating in varsity sports if they attended certain summer 
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cedures,133 and teacher hiring policies.134  Parents generally may opt 
out of these requirements only by choosing to send their children to 
private schools or by establishing a school in their own home—and by 
bearing the cost of either choice.135  But even parents who choose to 
send their children to nonpublic schools are subject to some state 
regulation in order to further the state’s interest in educating future 
citizens.  For instance, states may seek to enforce minimum educa-
tional standards.136  Parents also may not invoke their parental rights 
to escape the effect of antidiscrimination laws to which schools, both 
public and private, are subject.137  Instead, the state’s interest in regu-
training camps on the ground that parents did not have “a fundamental right to send 
their children to summer athletic camps,” and children did not have “a constitutional 
right to attend” such camps).  But see Laurenzo v. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 662 
F.2d 1117, 1119-20 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (recognizing that a school rule requir-
ing students to live with the parent to whom legal custody had been granted or face a 
one-year suspension from interscholastic competition could infringe on “the right of 
the family to determine living arrangements,” but dismissing the case as moot). 
133 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (“[T]he concept of parental 
delegation has been replaced by the view—more consonant with compulsory educa-
tion laws—that the State itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably 
necessary . . . .”). 
134 See Blau, 401 F.3d at 395-96 (stating that various aspects of public school, in-
cluding “the individuals hired to teach at the school” are “‘committed to the control of 
state and local authorities’” (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 578)).  Public schools, like pri-
vate schools, are also subject to Title VII.  See infra text accompanying note 143; see also 
Ponton v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (E.D. Va. 1986) (“The 
School Board and its employees clearly qualify as ‘employers’ within the meaning of 
[Title VII].”).
135 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268, U.S., 510, 535 (1925) (“The fundamental theory 
of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general 
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only.”); see also Blau, 401 F.3d at 395 (recognizing that parents do 
“have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a public school,” but 
also noting that “they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public 
school teaches their child”); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“[O]nce parents make the choice as to which school their children will attend, 
their fundamental right to control the education of their children is, at the least, sub-
stantially diminished.”). 
136 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (“[Pierce] lends no support to the 
contention that parents may replace state educational requirements with their own 
idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy 
member of society . . . .”). 
137 See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1973) (rejecting the claim 
that parental rights would be violated if the state refused to loan textbooks to all-white 
private schools, and holding that, although parents have a right to send their children 
to private schools, and although states have a “special interest in elevating the quality 
of education in both public and private schools,” states are not required to “grant aid 
to private schools without regard to constitutionally mandated standards forbidding 
  
2007] BETWEEN HOME AND SCHOOL 871 
 
lating discrimination, and in instilling the value of nondiscrimination, 
trumps any parental interest in using schools to practice the virtues of 
discrimination. 
For example, in Runyon v. McCrary,138 a Supreme Court case de-
cided in 1976, parents with children attending all-white private 
schools argued that their parental right to teach the value of segrega-
tion would be violated if the schools were forced, pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1981, to admit African-American students.  The Court recog-
nized that the parents, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
had a constitutional right to impart to their children whatever values 
and standards they deemed desirable, including the value of segrega-
tion.139  The Court concluded, however, that the parents’ rights would 
not be violated if the schools were required to admit African-
American students, because “‘there is no showing that discontinuance 
of [the] discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way 
the teaching in these schools of any ideas or dogma.’”140  In other 
words, the Court found that the mere presence of African-American 
students would not prevent the parents or the school from teaching 
that segregation is desirable. 
Returning to Dale, if the Boy Scouts is analogized to a private 
school, instead of to a parent, then Runyon suggests that the Boy 
Scouts cannot exclude Dale simply by invoking a desire to teach by 
example.  Just as the schools in Runyon were not exempt from § 1981, 
the Boy Scouts would not be exempt from New Jersey’s public ac-
commodations law.  Moreover, application of the New Jersey law 
would not automatically, or even necessarily, change the subject mat-
state-supported discrimination”); see also infra notes 138-143 and accompanying text 
(discussing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), and Title VII). 
138 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
139 Id. at 176-77. 
140 Id. at 176 (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).  
Accordingly, the Runyon Court rejected the parents’ First Amendment argument by 
drawing a distinction between speech and conduct.  See id. (“[I]t may be assumed that 
parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institu-
tions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that the children 
have an equal right to attend such institutions.  But it does not follow that the practice 
of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same prin-
ciple.” (first emphasis added)).  Some commentators have suggested that the Dale 
Court implicitly overruled this aspect of Runyon by holding that Dale’s mere presence 
would hinder the Boy Scouts’s message.  See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 74, at 1603 (“The 
Dale majority simply ignores Runyon.”).  However, such an interpretation also could 
mean that Dale overruled Jaycees, unless private schools are seen as fundamentally dif-
ferent from other private associations. 
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ter of the Boy Scouts’s teaching.  Rather, the Boy Scouts could con-
tinue to espouse its views on sexuality despite Dale’s presence, particu-
larly if, as indicated in the record, none of Dale’s troop members 
knew that he was gay.141  Additionally, even if the troop members knew 
about Dale’s sexuality, that facet of his identity would not prevent 
Dale from conforming his teachings to those desired by the Boy 
Scouts or, similar to the holding in Runyon, prevent the Boy Scouts 
from otherwise conveying its desired message to the boys under its 
care. 
Analogizing the Boy Scouts to a private school in this manner is 
tempting because the Boy Scouts’s activities are similar to school ac-
tivities.  In both instances, children of approximately the same age, 
and with different parents, come together to learn as a group.  Runyon 
does not serve as a perfect analogy, however, because James Dale was 
not seeking to be a youth member of the Boy Scouts.  Rather, Dale was 
seeking re-admittance as a troop leader, making him more like a 
teacher at a private school than a student. 
Acknowledging Dale’s teacher-like role does not change the fact 
that schools are subject to antidiscrimination laws.  Private schools 
may require their teachers to serve as role models, mandating that 
their behavior not conflict with the lessons the school is trying to 
teach.142  As such, private schools that ask students to remain abstinent 
until marriage may fire teachers who become pregnant out of wed-
lock.  However, as Runyon indicates, schools may not do so if termina-
tion would violate state or federal antidiscrimination laws.  For exam-
ple, because Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, 
such schools may dismiss unwed pregnant teachers only if they also 
fire male teachers who become fathers out of wedlock.143  In Dale, this 
141 See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. 
142 See Mark Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831, 853 (1987) 
(“[A] parochial school cannot convey its religious message[] if it is required to allow 
teachers to discuss the pros and cons of abortion or birth control.”). 
143 See, e.g., Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 
1996) (“Although Title VII requires that this code of conduct be applied equally to 
both sexes, defendant presented uncontroverted evidence at trial that [the president 
of the school] had terminated at least four individuals, both male and female, who had 
engaged in extramarital sexual relationships . . . .” (citation omitted)); Ganzy v. Allen 
Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[R]estrictions on sexual activ-
ity, applied equally to males and females, are not discriminatory.”); Vigars v. Valley 
Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 806-07 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that religious em-
ployers may discriminate on the basis of religion, but not sex); Dolter v. Wahlert High 
Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 270 n.5 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (“For example, if single male teachers 
at [the high school], known to have engaged in pre-marital sex, were equally dis-
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approach would mean that the Boy Scouts could not exclude Dale 
simply because he self-identified as a gay man, because New Jersey’s 
public accommodations law prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  Rather, if the Boy Scouts wished to exclude Dale, 
it would be required to investigate the sexual conduct of all of its 
troop leaders and show how particular sexual behavior conflicted with 
the lessons it attempts to impart. 
Of course, the above analysis depends on the Boy Scouts being 
analogized to a school, instead of to a parental surrogate.  Runyon is 
instructive, however, even if the Boy Scouts is viewed as a parental sur-
rogate.  Runyon emphasizes that parents do not have complete control 
over the rearing of their children; rather, parents must heed state 
mandates when their children are at school, even when their children 
attend private schools.  If parents are subject to such restrictions, then 
certainly parental surrogates, like the Boy Scouts, could be similarly 
constrained.  Therefore, the Boy Scouts could be subject to New Jer-
sey’s public accommodations law. 
An interesting counterpoint to Runyon and Dale can be found in 
the example of home schooling.  In contrast to Dale, in which a family 
function traditionally performed in the home could be seen as mov-
ing outside of the home, home schooling involves a function normally 
performed outside of the home being moved inside.  If parents have 
complete control over childrearing within the home, then the state’s 
regulation of education should stop at the home’s front door.  Yet this 
is not the case.  The state follows education into the home despite no-
tions of family privacy and parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of 
their children.144
Parental authority thus is not spatially determined, but instead is 
based on the type of childrearing being performed.  If the childrear-
ing is more in the nature of educating children to become informed 
charged[,] any inference of sexual discrimination otherwise shown might be dissi-
pated.”).  For an argument that such cases were wrongly decided, and that private 
schools should be shielded from antidiscrimination laws when hiring and firing teach-
ers, see Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale:  A 
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1577 (2001). 
144 States may regulate home schooling by mandating, inter alia, the minimum 
qualifications of the instructor, the curriculum, the number of days of instruction, the 
standardized tests that must be administered, and parental reporting obligations.  See, 
e.g., Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 128-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding 
state regulation of home schooling against parents’ free exercise and privacy chal-
lenges); HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 13, at 76 (discussing the wide variation of 
home schooling regulation by and among the states). 
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future citizens, then the state will enter the home and impose stan-
dards that may conflict with parental desires.145  Yet, in moving from 
the public to the private sphere, the state becomes less prescriptive 
and more deferential to parental prerogatives.  Indeed, the state in-
creasingly defers to parents as education moves from public schools to 
private schools to the home.  Likewise, when the childrearing tradi-
tionally performed within the home moves to organizations outside of 
the home, it is conceivable that the privacy accorded to such child-
rearing should gradually give way to state interests. 
The case that has given the most deference to parental authority 
to date, Wisconsin v. Yoder,146 could be read to support such an ap-
proach.  In that case, the Supreme Court held that Amish parents 
could remove their children from school after the eighth grade to 
protect them from worldly values, despite compulsory education laws 
mandating school attendance until the age of sixteen.147  The Court’s 
decision depended on unique elements of the Amish faith, particu-
larly its emphasis on living a simple life grounded in farming and its 
ethic of helping its members during times of trouble, instead of re-
sorting to the support of the state.148  Indeed, the Court emphasized 
that its holding was not grounded solely in its respect for secular pa-
rental prerogatives:  “A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, 
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of 
education if it is based on purely secular considerations . . . .”149  In-
stead, the Court respected parental authority because it was necessary 
to maintain a religion outside of mainstream society and to equip 
children to live within that religion.  No one suggested that the Amish 
could seek to achieve their parental goals by policing what happens at 
schools or at other sites in the public realm.150
145 One commentator has relied on this distinction between types of childrearing 
to explain the different outcomes in Dale and Runyon.  See Karen Lim, Note, Freedom to 
Exclude After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:  Do Private Schools Have a Right To Discrimi-
nate Against Homosexual Teachers?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2599, 2639 (2003) (“Simply 
stated, Runyon involved the state’s interest in liberal education and Dale did not. . . . 
The work of schools lies at the core of a state’s interest in education; the activity of the 
Boy Scouts is peripheral.”). 
146 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
147 Id. at 234-36. 
148 Id. at 209-13, 216-19. 
149 Id. at 215. 
150 And indeed, attempts by non-Amish parents to do so have been rejected.  See, 
e.g., Duro v. Dist. Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 98-99 (4th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Page, 385 F. 
Supp. 395, 400-05 (D.N.H. 1974). 
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Applying this analysis to the Boy Scouts would mean, at the very 
least, that the Boy Scouts should not be permitted to operate com-
pletely outside the zone of state power.  Rather, as an entity function-
ing between home and school, the Boy Scouts should be subject to 
some state-imposed limitations.  Such an approach could ultimately 
support outcomes that are quite different from the majority’s holding 
in Dale. 
III.  EMBRACING THE SPACES OF CHILDHOOD WITHIN FAMILY LAW 
Analogizing childrearing that takes place between home and 
school to the childrearing that takes place at either home or school 
may help make sense of the holding in Dale, but it also may provide a 
foundation for an alternative holding.  These conflicting outcomes 
indicate that analogies to home or school will rarely be dispositive.  
They do, however, provide a useful vehicle for examining existing ap-
proaches to childrearing within family law, and exploring how those 
approaches might be extended to childrearing that takes place be-
tween home and school.  The analogies also highlight the limits of the 
existing scope of family law, namely its failure to recognize that the 
spaces between home and school may be distinct from both home and 
school, rendering analogies to either concept ultimately inapposite. 
This Part calls for a theory that acknowledges childrearing be-
tween home and school for what it is, as opposed to how it is similar to 
the childrearing that takes place at either home or school.  The first 
Section situates the call for such a theory in relation to existing at-
tempts within family law to reflect more accurately the reality of family 
life.  The next Section explores the necessity of such a theory by dis-
cussing several factual scenarios that the theory could address.  Fi-
nally, the last Section explores potential contours and implications of 
the theory. 
A.  Extending the Functional Approach 
Recognizing the distinct reality of childrearing that takes place be-
tween home and school would be consistent with recent family law re-
forms designed to acknowledge the diverse reality of family life.  Sev-
eral states now permit same-sex couples to be considered legal families 
for all or some purposes,151 and stepchildren and other “de facto” 
151 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003) 
(recognizing same-sex marriage); CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West Supp. 2006) (extend-
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children are increasingly recognized as legal family members, even in 
the absence of adoption or biological ties.152  These new legal ap-
proaches to the family encompass more of the ways people actually 
live their lives.  Many people who consider themselves to be family, 
but who traditionally have not enjoyed the legal status of family, now 
are entitled to legal benefits and protections either because they sat-
isfy a functional test153 or, more commonly, because they fall within 
expanded definitions of legally recognized families.154
These changes in family law are the result, in large part, of legal 
scholarship that questioned why legal acknowledgement remained 
limited to the traditional nuclear family when various other associa-
tions function in very similar ways.  For example, Martha Minow has 
argued that groups of people who socialize their members and pro-
vide each other both life necessities and emotional security should be 
considered families for many purposes.155  Likewise, Barbara Bennett 
ing family recognition to registered domestic partners); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
38nn (West Supp. 2006) (extending family recognition to couples in registered civil 
unions); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (Supp. 2005) (extending family recognition to reg-
istered reciprocal beneficiaries); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-201(10-A), (17), 
(20) (2005) (extending family recognition with respect to inheritance rights to regis-
tered domestic partners); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A (West Supp. 2006) (extending par-
tial family recognition to registered domestic partners); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 
(2002) (extending family recognition to couples in registered civil unions); Lewis v. 
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that same-sex couples are entitled to all 
of the state benefits that heterosexual married couples enjoy). 
152 See generally John DeWitt Gregory, Defining the Family in the Millennium:  The 
Troxel Follies, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 687, 689-712 (2002) (describing cases and statutes 
extending some childrearing rights to grandparents, stepparents, foster parents, co-
parents, and de facto parents); Developments in the Law:  The Law of Marriage and Family, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2052-64 (2003) (same); see also ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03, at 107-08, 118-24 
(2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION] (proposing in-
creased legal recognition of de facto parents). 
153 See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-55 (N.Y. 1989) (using a 
functional analysis to define cohabiting same-sex partners as “family” for the purposes 
of New York’s rent-control laws).  But see Allison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29-30 
(N.Y. 1991) (refusing to recognize a biological mother’s former same-sex partner as a 
de facto parent for visitation purposes); In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 131-32 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (denying testator’s former same-sex partner the right to an elec-
tive share of testator’s estate because he did not qualify as a “husband” or “wife”). 
154 As such, status is still privileged over function, but legal status sometimes in-
cludes more of the ways that people live as families.  See supra notes 151-152 and ac-
companying text.  Of course, many people still are excluded from the definition of 
family in many states. 
155 See Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families:  Membership, Loving, and 
Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 287-88 (1992-1993) [hereinafter Minow, All in the Family]; 
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Woodhouse has argued that family law should recognize groups that 
nurture and support their household members, even if those in the 
support unit do not fit the traditional nuclear family form.156  Such 
scholarship,157 and the reforms following it, view the proper role of 
family law as reflecting and supporting individuals’ choices about the 
people with whom they share their lives. 
This functional approach to the family need not stop at family 
personnel.  If a goal of family law is to support families according to 
the realities of contemporary family life, then family law scholars and 
reformers must consider not only family composition, but also how—
and where—family functions are performed.  Such considerations have 
been largely absent from recent scholarship and reform proposals.158  
Instead, the new families increasingly recognized by the law tend to 
function very much like the traditional nuclear family, just with differ-
ent personnel.159  New people perform the same functions that have 
Martha Minow, Redefining Families:  Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 
270-72 (1991). 
156 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”:  
Toward a Communitarian Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 
576-84; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L. 
REV. 245, 279-80 (1990) (book review) (suggesting that the critical inquiry is “not 
whether the family form look[s] like a family, but whether it act[s] like one”). 
157 For other examples, see Bartlett, supra note 11, at 944-51 (proposing “[t]he 
concept of nonexclusive parenthood” in order to “permit[] recognition of de facto 
parenting relationships without severing the child’s relationships with natural or legal 
parents”); Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court:  Founding Fathers and Nurturing 
Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1309-20 (2005) (setting out a “redefinition of fatherhood 
around nurture”); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:  Redefining Par-
enthood To Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 
GEO. L.J. 459, 573 (1990) (concluding that “courts should redefine parenthood to in-
clude anyone in a functional parental relationship that a legally recognized parent 
created with the intent that an additional parent-child relationship exist”). 
158 This has not always been the case.  Most notably, in the 1960s and 1970s, family 
law scholars and activists responded to the gradual acceptance of gender equality by 
arguing that the law should no longer allocate spousal functions along gender lines.  
Legislatures and courts responded relatively quickly by eliminating official gender 
roles within the family.  See MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 60-61 (tracing the progress, since 
the 1960s, of judicial and legislative efforts to eradicate laws treating men and women 
differently based on “the patriarchal model of family governance”); Susan Frelich Ap-
pleton, Missing in Action?  Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 110-14 (2005) (describing the erosion of official gender 
roles in American family law over the past thirty years). 
159 For an excellent critique of this development, and of relying on function to ex-
pand definitions of the family in general, see Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for 
Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 319-23 (2004).  Hamilton’s critique is lim-
ited, however, to the desirability of using functional tests to determine changing family 
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been legally recognized in the past.  Adults in these families tend to be 
sexually involved with each other, much like they would be under tra-
ditional definitions of marriage, and the children are often blood re-
lations of at least one of the adults. 160  Moreover, these new families 
are recognized as functioning almost entirely in what continues to be 
considered a private realm, the sphere to which law has relegated 
most of family life.  In other words, the identities of family members 
may have changed, but the functions of family recognized by the law 
have, for the most part, remained static. 
New approaches to the “who” of family thus risk reinforcing exist-
ing notions of the “how” of family.  Such reinforcement would coin-
cide with the goals of family law scholars and reformers only if existing 
family law adequately reflected and supported the ways that families 
actually function.  That may be the case with respect to some aspects 
of adult familial relationships,161 but it seems much less likely with re-
spect to parent-child interactions.   
As discussed in Part I above, childrearing has never been confined 
to the home, even when children are not at school; rather, multiple 
actors have long engaged in childrearing in the spaces between home 
personnel.  She, like other family scholars, does not explicitly consider how such tests 
also could respond to other ways in which families have changed. 
160 See David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 MINN. 
L. REV. 791, 794 (2002) (noting that, in the context of constitutional rights such as pri-
vacy, new definitions of family have not embraced “more novel intimate configura-
tions”).  For example, when the American Law Institute proposed that its model family 
dissolution default rules be extended to all domestic partnerships, it defined such 
partnerships as those that function like marriage.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAM-
ILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 152, § 6.03, at 916-19. 
161 Though many changes have occurred with respect to dating patterns, accep-
tance of same-sex relationships, and the age of commitment, once adults decide to 
commit to long-term relationships, those relationships tend to be sexual relationships 
performed in the private realm, much like in the past.  It seems that few adult couples 
in sexual relationships attempt to engage in sexual relations in the public realm (al-
though they may want to), and that few adult couples live together solely on platonic 
terms.  But such choices may be the product of the law’s failure to recognize, or sup-
port, such activities.  Cf. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF  
INTIMACY 136 (1993) (describing the channeling function of family law by emphasizing 
how “law may shape behavior in complex ways through its affirmation or condemna-
tion of various types of conduct”); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in  
Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992) (same).  For a discussion of proposals to 
expand family definitions to include platonic domestic arrangements, see Nancy D. 
Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 203-09, 218-25 (2003) 
(discussing, inter alia, the Canadian approach as outlined in LAW COMM’N OF CAN.,  
BEYOND CONJUGALITY:  RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT  
RELATIONSHIPS (2001), available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/lcc-cdc/ 
beyond-conjugality-e/pdf/37152-e.pdf). 
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and school.162  Moreover, given middle-class women’s increasing par-
ticipation in the paid work force, and the greater demands of work in 
general, childrearing has been increasingly outsourced to various ac-
tors in these spaces.163  Recent changes in family life thus involve not 
only changes to the composition of family, but also changes in how, 
and where, some families perform their childrearing functions.  The 
existing functional approach to the family has yet to consider these 
facts.  Family law’s silence in this area risks reinforcing erroneous no-
tions that childrearing is performed solely by parents or the state, at 
home or at school. 
Such silence does more than create inaccurate impressions; it also 
can shape aspects of family life by specifying which childrearing activi-
ties are worthy of legal protections—through either regulation or ex-
plicit nonregulation164—and which are not.  Family law’s current focus 
on home and school most likely contributes to the salience of those 
sites for parents and children.  In particular, because parental rights 
are perceived to be most protected when childrearing takes place in 
the home, family law scholars must acknowledge that their silence 
about childrearing between home and school could contribute to the 
privatization of family life, by reinforcing the perception that child-
162 See, e.g., CREMIN, supra note 31, at 298-302 (discussing the rise of “formal and 
informal day nurseries,” beginning in the 1870s, which addressed the needs of both 
single-parent families and families where both parents worked outside of the home). 
163 The federal government acknowledged this fact when it passed the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000), which mandates only 
twelve weeks of unpaid work leave after the birth or adoption of a child.  Id.  
§ 2612(a)(1)(A); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-40 
(2003) (detailing the history, mechanics, and rationale of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act).  Presumably, most workers return to work after this leave, but the demands 
of childrearing will remain, necessitating that childrearing be performed by actors out-
side of the family unit.  In addition, the federal government has, in one context, man-
dated the outsourcing of childrearing by requiring mothers who receive public assis-
tance to work outside of the home.  See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Welfare Reform and 
Economic Freedom:  Low-Income Mothers’ Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1029, 1041-57 (2004) (noting the surge in demand for childcare 
after the passage of work requirements for public assistance recipients and the pres-
sure placed on recipients to value employment over childcare). 
164 JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 352 
(1994) (“[T]he private and even the intimate ‘spheres’ have always been constituted 
and regulated by law, even if what is constituted includes a domain of autonomous 
judgment that can come into conflict with law.”); Minow, supra note 119, at 7-8 n.15 
(stating that the state’s “noninvolvement in family matters expresses its approval, or at 
least its lack of disapproval, of what goes on in the private realm”). 
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rearing is a purely private activity and perhaps even encouraging some 
parents to keep children at home.165
Analyzing the spaces between home and school thus can illumi-
nate how people function both outside and within the spaces of home 
and school, and why they might do so.  Considering these spaces also 
can reveal much about the law’s role in constructing the poles that de-
fine them:  the poles of home and school.  Investigations of what 
makes the space between home and school different from either home 
or school may lead to clarification of what is at stake in both the home 
and the school spaces.  As such, explicitly considering this previously 
neglected space can shed light on what lies beneath the legal con-
struction of childrearing authority within the home and at school. 
What would it mean to expand the existing functional approach 
to the family by exploring how family law views, and should view, 
childrearing that takes place outside of the traditional contexts of 
home and school, by actors who are neither parents nor teachers?  As 
previously discussed, when childrearing is performed by parents in the 
home, it is often enveloped by common law and constitutional notions 
of privacy.  What happens to that privacy when childrearing is out-
sourced?  Does privacy attach to the childrearing function and travel 
outside of the home?  Or does privacy stay within the home, attaching 
to childrearing only to the extent it is performed within the private, 
domestic sphere?  If the latter is true, may the state intervene and 
regulate the childrearing function, much as it does in schools?  Or 
should the spaces between home and school be analogized to neither 
home nor school, and be viewed instead as distinct spaces requiring 
more tailored legal approaches? 
165 Cf. Judith Warner, Loosen the Apron Strings, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at A21 (dis-
cussing how many parents are not sending their children to summer camps because 
they want their children at home, and how “some parents even question whether those 
who send their children away for extended camps ‘really love their kids’”).  In addi-
tion, the law’s focus on the privacy of the home could encourage those parents who 
can afford it to hire nannies and housekeepers to take care of their children, instead of 
relying on caregivers outside of the home.  Although such actors are generally pre-
sumed not to provide the same type of care as parents, their operation within the 
home means that parents can dictate their childrearing practices free from state inter-
vention.  See supra text accompanying notes 124-126.  Accordingly, the care provided 
by nannies and housekeepers is outside the scope of this Article’s focus on childrear-
ing between home and school. 
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B.  Current Controversies Between Home and School 
Thinking about childrearing that occurs between home and 
school is more than an academic exercise.  Parents have increasingly 
sought to exert control over activities that take place in these con-
tested spaces.  Because no settled doctrine governs such claims, the 
results are often inconsistent.  Exploring these inconsistencies can 
highlight what is at stake in the spaces between home and school and 
can help explain the ways in which analogies to home and school of-
ten fail to consider all pertinent interests. 
Many attempts to extend parental authority beyond the home 
suggest a vision of parenting and childrearing that hinges on control 
of one’s child, regardless of location.  Parents seek to control the mes-
sages to which their children are exposed in the spaces between home 
and the classroom, as well as to control their children’s very presence 
in those spaces.  Such control has been valued as a way to foster diver-
sity and pluralism; children are “not the mere creature of the state,” 
but also are influenced by their parents, who reflect the pluralistic na-
ture of our society.166  In addition, many commentators have defended 
broad notions of parental control by arguing that those with the great-
est stake and investment in a child should oversee the child’s devel-
opment.167  To permit the state, or others,168 to intervene in the par-
166 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); see also Buss, supra note 3, 
at 32 (stating that parents’ “developmental competence” should be favored over the 
state’s competence “in the interest of pluralism and experimentation”); Davis, supra 
note 110, at 1371 (arguing that parents must be given the right to “embrace, act upon, 
and advocate privately chosen values”). 
167 For examples of this argument, see Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle:  Parental 
Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 284-90; John E. Coons, Intellec-
tual Liberty and the Schools, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 495, 505-10 (1985); 
Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children:  A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 
940-41 (1996); Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1077-79 (2003); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as 
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2415 (1995). 
168 These arguments favoring parental control also are made with respect to limit-
ing the rights of third parties, such as grandparents, to intervene in the parent-child 
relationship.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (“[T]he decision 
whether . . . an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case 
is for the parent to make in the first instance.”); Buss, supra note 167, at 284-90 (ex-
ploring the appropriate degree of deference to parental decisions); Scott, Parental 
Autonomy, supra note 167, at 1097-98 (discussing the potential negative effects on par-
ents and children that could be caused by “the legal recognition of third party custody 
and visitation claims”).  But see Bartlett, supra note 11, at 961-63 (arguing that the state 
should recognize multiple parents when a child has developed child-parent relation-
ships outside of the traditional nuclear family); Meyer, supra note 2, at 586-87 (arguing 
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ent-child relationship would decrease incentives for parents to invest 
in their children, thereby reducing family intimacy169 and shifting 
childrearing responsibility away from those who are considered to be 
most competent to raise the child, because of daily interaction and 
the knowledge and emotional connections that flow from that inter-
action.170
These justifications for parental control have traditionally been 
deployed to argue against state interference in the family.  Families 
are a site of diversity and pluralism largely because they are permitted 
to operate outside of the zone of state power;171 hence, the state can-
not “standardize its children.”172  Implicit in such arguments is the as-
sumption that families function primarily in the private realm of the 
home.  If this were not the case, families could be exposed to the taint 
of state power. 
Recent attempts to extend parental authority outside of the home 
challenge this assumption, demanding that parental control over 
children be protected even in the public realm.173  Pursuant to this 
view, family privacy is not limited to the home but rather attaches to 
the childrearing function, even when that function is performed out-
side of the home or is performed by parental surrogates.  Family law’s 
neglect of the spaces between home and school could be interpreted 
as supporting such a view.  Indeed, such neglect could be the natural 
product of a normative view that all nonstate childrearing should be 
that some of parents’ decision-making authority should give way to the state’s interest 
in maintaining children’s ongoing relationships with extended family members). 
169 See, e.g., Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral 
Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 6, 17 (1980) (“[R]egulation transforms relationships into 
less intimate ones.”). 
170 See, e.g., Emily Buss, Essay, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002) (ad-
vocating deference to parental decisions because parents are “the child-specific ex-
perts most qualified to assess and pursue their children’s best interests in most circum-
stances”). 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 117-126. 
172 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
173 Some parents have even gone so far as to argue that their childrearing author-
ity entitles them to control the curriculum of public schools.  For the most part, how-
ever, these claims have been unsuccessful.  See supra note 132 (listing cases where par-
ents’ views were not permitted to trump the views of school officials); see also Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15-18 (2004) (rejecting a noncustodial par-
ent’s challenge to the content of the Pledge of Allegiance, which was recited at his 
daughter’s school, because the parent’s custodial status rendered him without standing 
to assert the claim).  This Article focuses solely on parental attempts to extend their 
authority in the spaces between home and school—areas where relatively little law cur-
rently exists. 
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subsumed within the sphere of family privacy—controlled by private 
ordering and unregulated by the state. 
Despite strong arguments in favor of parental control in general, 
family law scholars have not articulated a rationale for extending that 
control outside of the home and into public realms short of the 
schoolhouse door.  Moreover, courts have been largely unsympathetic 
to parents’ claims that state regulation of various spaces between 
home and school interferes with their right to rear their children.  In-
stead, as discussed in more detail below,174 courts have in fact permit-
ted the state to regulate many of the spaces between home and school.  
These situations thus provide insight into the current limits of paren-
tal power, challenging the view that family law scholars have been si-
lent about childrearing between home and school because it is obvi-
ous that parents should control such childrearing. 
In some situations, it is not surprising that courts have permitted 
states to limit parental prerogatives, because parents have sought to 
extend their authority to realms long considered to be part of the 
state’s domain.175  For example, nudist parents in Texas invoked Dale 
to argue that a local law permitting adults to sunbathe nude in a 
county park, but excluding all children from the park, interfered with 
their right to teach their children the values of the nudist, or “natur-
ist,” lifestyle.176  The state court disagreed, emphasizing that the state 
has an interest in regulating all activity, including childrearing activity, 
that occurs on state land.  The court concluded that the law at issue 
constituted a permissible regulation, because “[t]he rules do not af-
fect the ability of . . . naturist parents to associate with their children, 
but regulate only where such associations may occur.”177  The court also 
distinguished Dale by emphasizing the different manner of childrear-
ing employed by the nudists: 
While appellants and the Boy Scouts may share a common goal to instill 
values in children, the manner in which these values are transmitted is 
distinguishable.  The Boy Scouts, as an organization, seeks to transfer its 
174 See infra notes 176-192 and accompanying text. 
175 These cases are thus analogous to cases where parents have unsuccessfully 
sought to control public school curricula.  See supra notes 132, 173. 
176 Cent. Tex. Nudists v. County of Travis, No. 03-00-00024-CV, 2000 WL 1784344, 
at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2000). 
177 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).  The court analogized this case to City of Dallas v. 
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an ordinance 
barring minors from certain dance halls; the court also cited Runyon as support for the 
assertion that parental rights are not absolute, but rather are subject to some regula-
tion.  Cent. Tex. Nudists,  2000 WL 1784344, at *3-4. 
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values to its members by “having its adult leaders spend time with the 
youth members, instructing and engaging them in activities like camp-
ing, archery, and fishing.”  In contrast, appellants seek to convey their 
values to their children by engaging in swimming, sunbathing, and other 
forms of recreation in the nude at McGregor Park.  Of critical impor-
tance to appellants is not the activity itself, but rather, the manner in 
which the activity is conducted—in the nude and in public.
178
Other attempts to extend parental authority beyond the home 
present closer questions, yet courts still have upheld state regulations 
limiting parental authority in such cases.  Most notably, parents have 
been largely unsuccessful in challenging local curfew ordinances, even 
though such ordinances can substitute the views of the state for par-
ents’ own views of when and where their children should be able to 
travel.  These decisions seem to be motivated by the state’s interests in 
protecting the safety of children, making the curfew laws similar to 
other state involvement that occurs upon family default.  In particular, 
courts seem to question why parents would permit their children to 
leave the home at night.  As one court has stated, parents’ right to di-
rect the upbringing of their children “does not extend to . . . unilater-
ally determin[ing] when and if children will be on the streets—
certainly at night.  That is not among the ‘intimate family decisions’ 
encompassed by such a right.”179  In the end, however, such holdings 
may not reveal much about the scope of parental power, because most 
178 Cent. Tex. Nudists, 2000 WL 1784344, at *5 (citation omitted) (quoting Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649 (2000)).  A similar rationale would likely apply 
to attempts by parents to exert control over childrearing in other public spaces, such as 
municipal swimming pools or public libraries. 
179 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(plurality opinion) (quoting and discussing Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 
843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998), which stated that “[t]he Charlottesville ordinance, prohibit-
ing young children from remaining unaccompanied on the streets late at night, simply 
does not implicate the kinds of intimate family decisions considered in the above 
cases”).  But Chief Judge Edwards, concurring in Hutchins, resisted the comparison to 
state involvement upon family default, emphasizing that 
when the Government does intervene in the rearing of children without re-
gard to parents’ preferences, “it is usually in response to some significant 
breakdown within the family unit or in the complete absence of parental care-
taking,” or to enforce a norm that is critical to the health, safety, or welfare of 
minors.  The difficult question, then, is how to accommodate both the state’s 
interests and parents’ rights where there has been no specific finding of a 
breakdown within an identified family unit and there is no indisputable threat 
to the health, safety, or welfare of minors. 
Id. at 550-51 (Edwards, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Action for Chil-
dren’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J., dissent-
ing)). 
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curfew ordinances have been upheld on the theory that their restric-
tions coincide with the presumed intent of most parents and contain 
adequate exceptions to accommodate parental wishes.180  Indeed, cur-
few laws have been struck down as a violation of parental rights only 
when they were extremely broad and contained limited exceptions.181
Another case, White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube,182 seems much more 
at odds with notions of parental authority, particularly the type of def-
erence to parental prerogatives that could be seen as underlying the 
holding in Dale.  In 2004, the state of Virginia amended its summer 
camp licensing law.  The amendment requires the state department of 
health to deny any license application made by a “nudist camp for ju-
veniles,” which is defined to be any camp where juveniles attend 
openly in the nude and are not accompanied by a parent, grandpar-
ent, or guardian.183  As recounted in subsequent litigation, the 
amendment was passed after a nudist organization operated a week-
long juvenile nudist camp at a private nudist campground in the state 
in 2003.  The camp offered traditional summer camp activities, along 
with “an educational component designed to teach the values associ-
ated with social nudism through topics such as ‘Nudity and the Law,’ 
‘Overcoming the Clothing Experience,’ ‘Puberty Rights Versus Pu-
berty Wrongs,’ and ‘Nudism and Faith.’”184  Seeking to operate a simi-
lar camp in 2004, but facing the new amendment, the organization, 
the campground, and three sets of parents sued the state department 
180 Indeed, in Hutchins, the majority found that the D.C. curfew was constitutional 
because the ordinance reinforced parental authority; no restrictions were imposed on 
juveniles’ activities if the minors were accompanied by a parent or by an adult author-
ized by the parent.  Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 545.  Moreover, parents could allow their 
children to run errands during curfew hours, and juveniles could attend official 
school, religious, or other civic activities.  See id. (analogizing to Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968), where a state regulation prohibiting the sale of porno-
graphic magazines to minors contained an exception that permitted parents to buy the 
magazines for their children); see also Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 493-95 (5th Cir. 
1993) (finding a youth curfew constitutional because it was narrowly tailored). 
181 See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946-49 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a 
youth curfew unconstitutional because “it does not provide exceptions for many le-
gitimate activities, with or without parental permission”); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 
658 F.2d 1065, 1071-74 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (striking a curfew with no exemp-
tion for school activities, religious meetings, entertainment events, or athletic pur-
suits); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1117-19 (Fla. 2004) (holding that a curfew ordi-
nance was unconstitutional because it made minors’ conduct illegal even when they 
had the permission of their parents to be on the streets after curfew hours). 
182 413 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2005). 
183 VA. CODE ANN. § 35.1-18 (2005). 
184 White Tail, 413 F.3d at 455. 
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of health, challenging the validity of the amendment.  Specifically, the 
complaint asserted that the amendment violated the “plaintiffs’ right 
to privacy and to control the education and rearing of their children 
under the Fourteenth Amendment; and . . .  [their] First Amendment 
right to free association.”185
As such, White Tail is like Dale, but with the family privacy claims 
explicitly alleged.  The plaintiffs have not challenged the general li-
censing of summer camps, which can be justified on public health 
and safety grounds.  Rather, the plaintiffs have objected to the state’s 
interference with the nudist camp’s operations.  It is hardly controver-
sial that one of the primary purposes of any summer camp is to pro-
vide children with an escape from their parents (and vice versa) dur-
ing the summer.186  To deny this opportunity to nudists who wish to 
communicate the values—and practices—of nudism to children on 
private land seems to interfere with the rights of parents and parental 
surrogates to engage in the childrearing of their choice. 
It is unclear, however, whether courts will afford the nudist or-
ganization and parents the same deference that was afforded to the 
Boy Scouts, even though both cases involve attempts to instill values in 
young people.  The federal district court denied the plaintiffs a pre-
liminary injunction and dismissed the case as moot after the nudist 
organization cancelled the 2004 camp.187  The Fourth Circuit reversed 
in part, holding that the claims brought by the nudist organization 
and the nudist campground were not moot,188 but that only the nudist 
organization, and not the campground, had standing.189  Both the or-
ganization and the campground had “asserted injuries to the organi-
zations themselves,”190 but only the organization provided evidence 
showing how the amendment would harm its interests in educating 
185 Id. at 456. 
186 Indeed, one of the sets of parents in White Tail explained that they challenged 
the amended statute because they believed the nudist camp “experience would be 
more valuable if [the children] were able to spend the week away from us.”  Id. at 457-
58 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Warner, supra note 165, at A21 (remark-
ing that her child was “truly fortunate” to be away from her while at summer camp). 
187 White Tail, 413 F.3d at 456. 
188 The Fourth Circuit held that the claims brought by the nudist organization and 
the nudist campground continued to present a live controversy because the two enti-
ties operated the camp in 2003 “with the expectation that it would become an annual 
event,” and the organization subsequently applied for a permit to hold the camp at the 
campground in 2005.  Id. at 457 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
189 Id. at 459-62. 
190 Id. at 459 (emphasis omitted). 
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“nudist youth and inculcat[ing] them with the values and traditions 
that are unique to the culture and history of the . . . American social 
nudist movement” by reducing the size of the camp.191  The Fourth 
Circuit upheld the finding of mootness with respect to the parents’ 
claims, because nothing in the record indicated that the particular 
plaintiffs intended to enroll their children in the camp in any subse-
quent summer.192
The district court now must consider the merits of the nudist or-
ganization’s claims.  The holding in Dale would seem to suggest that 
the nudist organization should be permitted to operate largely outside 
the zone of state power and hence be exempt from the amendment.  
Indeed, the nudist camp seems to resemble Boy Scout camps 
throughout the nation.  However, the Virginia state legislature passed 
its amendment well after Dale was decided.  Virginia clearly believed 
that it had a legitimate interest in limiting minors’ access to nudist 
teachings outside of the presence of their parents.  The district court 
very well could conclude that nudity alone is sufficient to distinguish 
the case from Dale, a conclusion that could be supported by precedent 
where parents were declared unfit, in part because they took their 
minor children to nudist camps or were otherwise involved with nud-
ist colonies.193  Yet nudist practices by themselves have not constituted 
sufficient parental default to justify state intervention in the home in 
191 Id. at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court stated that the size of 
the camp would likely be reduced “because not all would-be campers have parents or 
guardians who are available to register and attend a week of camp during the sum-
mer.”  Id. 
192 Id. at 457-58. 
193 See, e.g., Fish v. Fish, Jr., 881 A.2d 342, 346-47 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (uphold-
ing lower court’s denial of custody to father because, in part, he made inappropriate 
and suggestive comments, “walked around the house in an open bathrobe exposing his 
genitals in [the child’s] presence and . . . joked about going to a nudist colony with 
her”); William S.V., Jr. v. Ann S.V., No. CN90-7921, 1991 WL 275151, at *7, *12 (Del. 
Fam. Ct. Oct. 28, 1991) (identifying the father’s attendance at nudist colonies as a fac-
tor in determining the best interests of the child, and ultimately awarding primary cus-
tody to the mother, who had previously served as the primary caregiver); Jankowski v. 
Jankowski, No. 258466, 2005 WL 1185611, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 2005) (con-
cluding that an extended family member “would not be an appropriate father figure” 
for a mother’s children because he was “abusive and belittling,” failed to understand 
the seriousness of the children’s problems, and took one of the children to a nudist 
colony several times); Barr v. Barr, No. 207014, 1999 WL 33437891, at *1 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Aug. 13, 1999) (upholding lower court order prohibiting father from taking child 
to any nudist facility during visitation periods). 
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other cases.194  Is nudity sufficient to distinguish White Tail from Dale 
and to justify state regulation limiting the authority of parents to con-
trol childrearing outside of the home, in private spaces between home 
and school? 
Another Supreme Court decision may provide some guidance, 
while also highlighting the often inconsistent approach taken in cases 
involving childrearing disputes outside the traditional scope of family 
law.  In Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Court enjoined enforcement of a federal 
statute designed to protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit 
material on the Internet because the government failed to show that 
the statute’s approach was superior to alternative means that would 
infringe less on adults’ access to Internet content.195  Therefore, as was 
the case in Dale, the Court held that state regulation was impermissi-
ble.  Here, however, the regulation could be viewed as supporting pa-
rental authority; groups of parents had enlisted the state to help them 
limit their children’s Internet access.  In contrast to Dale, the holding 
in Ashcroft refused to defer to the prerogatives of these parents or of 
their surrogates.  Rather, the Court permitted the First Amendment 
rights of adults, as a general group, to trump the desires of those par-
ents who wished to limit their children’s Internet activity.196  The hold-
ing is particularly striking from a family law perspective because the 
statute was designed, in large part, to help parents control the mes-
sages their children receive via the Internet within the home.197  Cyber-
space is therefore carved out from the space of the home, and differ-
ent rules apply. 
194 See Hadley v. Cox, 470 So. 2d 735, 736-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing 
restrictions on a child’s ability to visit her mother’s home at a nudist camp because her 
father failed to prove that the nudist park was detrimental to the child’s welfare). 
195 542 U.S. 656, 666-70 (2004). 
196 This reading of Ashcroft is based on the Court’s emphasis on the various ways 
the regulation would impede adults’ First Amendment rights.  See id. at 667.  Another 
potential way to look at the holding in Ashcroft is to view the regulation as infringing on 
the rights of parents who want their children to enjoy wide Internet access.  But even 
this view of Ashcroft conflicts with the holding in Dale, because the Dale court never 
considered how the Boy Scouts’s views conformed to, or conflicted with, the views of 
New Jersey parents who permitted their children to be Boy Scouts.  See supra notes 101-
102 and accompanying text. 
197 As one commentator has stated, “the widespread availability of [indecent] ma-
terial in the larger society makes it virtually impossible for parents to act effectively on 
their own.  Instead, if parents are to have meaningful rights in this area, the commu-
nity must have the power to regulate the manner in which such material is distrib-
uted.”  Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 531, 608 (2003). 
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Like the outcome in Dale, then, the fate of the nudist summer 
camps could depend on one court’s view of the proper analogy.  
Camps—even those on private land—could be viewed as similar to cy-
berspace:  a realm where societal norms trump parental prerogatives.  
This approach, however, could cast doubt on the holding in Dale; for  
if Virginia has a legitimate interest in limiting the manner in which 
teenagers may live the nudist lifestyle at nudist summer camps on pri-
vate land, presumably promoting the values of modesty outside of the 
home,198 then New Jersey arguably has a legitimate interest in promot-
ing the values of nondiscrimination at places of public accommoda-
tion like the Boy Scouts.  Analogizing the camps to the home would 
eliminate this incompatibility.  Consistent with Dale, parental authority 
could be extended outside of the home to protect the camps as enti-
ties functioning as parental surrogates.  Nonetheless, the differing lev-
els of deference to the prerogatives of parents and their surrogates 
expressed in Ashcroft and Dale would remain. 
For the most part, family law scholars have not theorized what 
should happen in cases like White Tail, due to their general neglect of 
childrearing between home and school.  Although this neglect could 
be interpreted as reflecting a normative default of parental control in 
all spaces but school, courts have not embraced that view.  Instead, as 
the cases discussed above indicate, courts have at times extended pa-
rental control and at other times thwarted it.  This doctrinal inconsis-
tency is significant for family law as a whole, and even for those family 
law scholars who do not wish to explore childrearing between home 
and school, because such inconsistency reveals much about the cur-
rent contours of family privacy. 
The cases discussed above signal a partial rejection of the privacy 
traditionally thought to be afforded to families.  Instead of deferring 
to parents, the cases reveal that courts often permit the state to regu-
late childrearing that concerns sex and other issues of morality.  Even 
the curfew cases could be viewed as state attempts to limit minors’ op-
portunities to engage in sex, drinking, drug use, and other nighttime 
activities.  The boundaries of family privacy are thus constructed not 
by respect for parental prerogatives, but by the views of states and 
198 Although the Virginia statute does permit minors to attend nudist summer 
camps if they are accompanied by a parent or other legal guardian, that requirement, 
in effect, prevents the camp from operating, because fundamental to the definition of 
“camp” is the provision of places where children spend time away from their parents.  
See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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courts regarding appropriate sexual conduct.199  When childrearing 
conforms to those views, family privacy is respected.  When childrear-
ing challenges those views, family privacy ends. 
The location of childrearing matters in this construction of family 
privacy.  If the childrearing activities at issue in the above cases had 
taken place in the family home, the state would not have been permit-
ted to regulate them or to intervene in any other manner, unless the 
activities amounted to abuse or neglect.200  Because the childrearing in 
the above cases took place outside of the home, however, the exis-
tence of abuse or neglect was not even litigated.  Instead, in most in-
stances, courts weighed the state’s interests in the challenged regula-
tion against the parents’ interests in directing the upbringing of their 
children.  Childrearing was not permitted to exist outside the zone of 
state power, where it generally exists when performed within the 
home;201 rather, it was subject to the state’s views regarding appropri-
ate childrearing. 
Such balancing between the interests of the state and parents also 
occurs when parents challenge state educational regulations govern-
ing schools.  In those instances, however, the state interest is clear:  
the education of future citizens.202  In the cases concerning childrear-
ing between home and school, the state’s interests are often less clear, 
and there is little legal precedent evaluating those interests.  As illus-
trated above,203 analogies to previously recognized forms of childrear-
ing—analogies to childrearing at home or school—often do not pro-
vide sufficient guidance to courts, because childrearing between 
home and school can be distinct from that performed at home or 
199 Cf. Dailey, supra note 49, at 956 (“Far from prohibiting state intervention in a 
prepolitical social sphere, the ideal of family privacy expresses a particular set of family 
values by protecting only those social relations that the state deems worth protect-
ing.”).  Other scholars have made a similar point with respect to the state’s role in de-
fining family.  See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:  INCLUSION, 
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 276 (1990) (“Rather than marking a boundary limit-
ing state intervention in the family, laws governing the family define the kinds of fami-
lies the state approves.”). 
200 Of course, abuse and neglect can be defined in different ways, and definitions 
can be particularly expansive if states do not approve of the family form in question.  
See supra note 120 (discussing the work of Dorothy Roberts and Martha Fineman, 
among others, which reveals that families of color and poor, single mothers are af-
forded much less privacy than other families).  Unlike the cases discussed here, how-
ever, the state claims the existence of abuse or neglect before it intervenes. 
201 See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra Part II. 
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school, by parents or teachers.  Analytical and normative incoherence 
can thus result, calling into question the parameters of family privacy. 
C.  The Beginnings of a Theory of Childrearing  
Between Home and School 
A broader normative view about the interests at stake when child-
rearing takes place at locations other than home and school could go 
a long way toward providing a more consistent approach to family pri-
vacy, and toward clarifying whether and why location should matter in 
determining the respect accorded to that privacy.  The remainder of 
this Article sets forth one possible normative approach that could 
guide courts and others confronted with childrearing between home 
and school.  This discussion also hopes to spur future conversation 
about the meanings of privacy and pluralism within family law as a 
whole. 
The analysis in this Article supports the conclusion that family law 
should ensure that the spaces between home and school remain vital 
locations of children’s development and an integral part of civil soci-
ety.204  One way to achieve this goal is for family law scholars to de-
velop a theory of childrearing that:  first, acknowledges the myriad 
ways that children are socialized outside of school and family; second, 
explores the ways such childrearing can expose children to diverse 
ways of life, thereby creating pluralism within the family as well as 
without; and finally, promotes such pluralism by permitting childrear-
ing between home and school to operate largely free from state con-
trol, subject only to limited, inclusion-oriented regulations. 
Explicitly acknowledging childrearing between home and school 
is a necessary first step in redressing family law’s neglect of this sphere 
of childrearing.  In this inquiry, location is primarily a threshold issue, 
or a means to identify a range of childrearing practices that are not 
currently addressed by the existing scope of family law.  Once the 
practices are identified, the actual location of the practices matters 
204 This Article adopts a broad definition of civil society, specifically that articu-
lated by Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, who define “civil society” as “a sphere of social 
interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere 
(especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), 
social movements, and forms of public communication.”  COHEN & ARATO, supra note 
164, at ix.  For a brief discussion of disagreements about the proper scope of civil soci-
ety, see Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 381 n.9 
(2000).
  
892 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 833 
 
much less than do the actors who engage in the socialization of chil-
dren in those spaces—and the functions they serve. 
Acknowledging childrearing between home and school therefore 
means acknowledging the ways that many children are socialized not 
just by parents and teachers, but also by many other actors.  As dis-
cussed earlier in Part I,205 the identities of these actors vary from child to 
child in ways that often correlate to race, class, geography, religion, 
gender, or parental preference.  The important common denominator, 
however, is that these actors are neither the children’s parents nor their 
teachers.  This difference matters to children.  The social science litera-
ture indicates that children perceive these actors to be different from 
teachers or parents, and, as a result, children respond to them differ-
ently.206  The current scope of family law implies that this difference is 
one of lack of influence—that exposure to these actors is not important 
to child socialization.  A theory that acknowledges childrearing between 
home and school could examine the full range of this difference in any 
given situation, from lack of influence to reinforcement of parental au-
thority to the positing of alternative ways of life.  Moreover, these actors 
often engage in different types of childrearing than do parents or 
teachers, frequently conveying information about the practices and 
preferences of the community and various subcommunities in which 
children live.  Instead of conveying information about a particular fam-
ily’s values, as parents often do, or conveying substantive knowledge and 
information about the requirements of democratic citizenship, as 
teachers often do, the actors between home and school convey informa-
tion about the values of people and organizations existing outside of 
individual families but not subsumed by the state.  This information 
may overlap with information about community values conveyed by 
parents and teachers, but it will often be different. 
Such transmission of community values may seem obvious, given 
the Boy Scouts’s repeated statements in the Dale litigation that the or-
ganization seeks to instill values in young people.207  The Supreme 
Court’s analysis, however, focused on the organization’s ability to con-
vey its message, not on how that message was received by its youth 
members.  In fact, the Supreme Court did not consider the interests 
of the boys of the Boy Scouts at all, instead evaluating the case as one 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 34-38. 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 75-83. 
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that pitted a private adult association against the state.208  The Court 
overlooked the actual messages that the boys may have received from 
the Boy Scouts, or the ways the boys may have been affected by those 
messages.  Family law need not continue this neglect. 
After acknowledging childrearing between home and school, fam-
ily law scholars can explore how this childrearing relates to the tradi-
tion of pluralism within family law.  Scholars have long explored, and 
often extolled, the role families play “in maintaining the diverse moral 
values and traditions that comprise the pluralist foundation of our 
liberal political order, values and traditions that in turn serve to 
counter the threat that unmediated state power poses to moral diver-
sity.”209  Indeed, the desire for such pluralism is a primary justification 
for respecting family privacy and parental control.210
Pluralism currently exists only between families, however.  Our so-
ciety is pluralistic because many types of families are permitted to exist 
largely free from state indoctrination.  In contrast, pluralism rarely ex-
ists within families.  Children are generally exposed to just one belief 
system within the family, or at most two.211  Therefore, although chil-
dren may not be standardized by the state,212 they often are standard-
ized within their own families.  Pluralism may exist on a broad, socie-
tal level, but children rarely experience pluralism on a micro level, 
within their own families. 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 66-75. 
209 Dailey, supra note 49, at 958-59; see also MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 82 (discussing 
how “[f]amilies may function as . . . enclaves that can work out and nurture alternative 
conceptions of self, community, and justice”); Davis, supra note 110, at 1371 (“People 
are not meant to be socialized to uniform, externally imposed values.  People are able 
to form families and other intimate communities within which children might be dif-
ferently socialized . . . .”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 
786-87 (1989) (describing the mandatory public schooling law in Pierce as one that “po-
tentially subjected these individuals to a narrowly directed existence”). 
210 See supra text accompanying note 166; see also Dailey, supra note 49, at 1023 
(“The family is subject to constitutional protection, therefore, not because it is an 
arena of negative liberty, as conventional wisdom would have it, but because it serves 
both to deploy and to constrain the political power of the state.”). 
211 Each child is given just one family, but divorce or other factors may lead par-
ents to convey two, often divergent, belief systems to their children.  See, e.g., ELIZA-
BETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS:  THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF DI-
VORCE 84-85 (2005) (explaining that young adults from divorced families rarely 
perceived their parents’ values as unified or complementary); Minow, All in the Family, 
supra note 155, at 288-97 (presenting a general discussion of diversity within families 
during marriage and postdivorce situations); Volokh, supra note 21, at 692-97 (discuss-
ing circumstances that can arise after divorce, under which parents may teach different 
ideologies to children). 
212 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
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Childrearing between home and school can expose children to 
other ways of life, thereby making the promise of pluralism more mean-
ingful to children.  Children, of course, are still steeped in the tradi-
tions of their parents when they interact in the spaces between home 
and school, but they are also exposed to alternative viewpoints, differ-
ent ways of living as children, and diverse models for adult life.  Other 
family law scholars have emphasized that children benefit from such 
exposure because it enables them to later make informed choices about 
how they wish to live their adult lives.  Most of these scholars, however, 
call on the state to ensure that children are exposed to these mes-
sages.213  The analysis in this Article suggests that exposure may be bet-
ter achieved by fostering pluralism in the spaces between home and 
school.  Such pluralism could serve as an antidote to both state dogma 
and the standardization that can occur within the family. 
The final element of a theory of childrearing between home and 
school therefore must ask whether the state should intervene to foster 
or restrain childrearing between home and school, or whether, consis-
tent with the outcome in Dale, the state should leave those spaces un-
regulated, permitting parents and nonstate entities to engage in the 
childrearing practices of their choice with neither support nor dis-
couragement from the state.  This Article suggests that the answer lies 
somewhere in between.  Given the traditional emphasis on pluralism 
in family law, state regulation seems undesirable because it risks im-
posing a narrow, state-sanctioned view of childrearing upon the spaces 
between home and school, potentially infringing on parents’ ability to 
convey their own values to their children.  Indeed, such an approach 
would, in many instances, give the state some measure of control over 
more than half of children’s everyday lives.  However, if family law also 
cares about fostering pluralism within the family, then nonregulation 
also seems undesirable, because it would cede childrearing between 
home and school to the control of parents and their surrogates.  Im-
213 See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 79-80 (“[T]oleration should not extend 
to . . . systems of family governance that would replicate” intolerant or oppressive 
worldviews); Dena S. Davis, The Child’s Right to an Open Future:  Yoder and Beyond, 26 
CAP. U. L. REV. 93, 93-97 (1997) (defending, in qualified terms, the right of the state to 
intervene when “parents . . . make choices for their children that dramatically limit the 
children’s possibilities for an open future”); Dolgin, supra note 18, at 383-88 (contend-
ing that Yoder did not rest on a general right of parents to shield their children from 
the broader culture); Woodhouse, supra note 48, at 1117-22 (arguing that, while 
“[n]either the state nor the parent owns” children, “each must genuinely love them 
and take responsibility for their future”). 
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portant opportunities to expose children to the diversity of the 
broader civil society would therefore be lost. 
Accordingly, a broad conception of pluralism can best be served 
by permitting childrearing between home and school to operate 
largely free from state control, subject only to limited inclusion-
oriented, or pluralism-enhancing, regulations.214  Actors engaged in 
childrearing between home and school, such as the Boy Scouts or the 
White Tail Park summer camp, would be permitted to engage in the 
childrearing of their choice, much as parents are permitted—and 
even encouraged—to do.  But because the space between home and 
school often provides the most meaningful opportunities for children 
to experience pluralism, these actors would not be permitted to oper-
ate completely outside the zone of state power.215  Rather, the state 
should intervene in a limited way to ensure that the actors do not 
thwart the potential of these spaces to expose children to diverse ways 
of life within the broader civil society. 
In the context of the Dale litigation, this normative approach 
would mean that the Boy Scouts would not be permitted to exclude 
Dale as a troop leader, because the state of New Jersey has decided, in 
passing its public accommodations law, that discrimination against 
homosexuals in spaces like the Boy Scouts is at odds with the state’s 
conception of civil society.  The state therefore has affirmed that it 
supports the type of pluralism articulated here.  Moreover, application 
of the public accommodations law would serve the approach’s plural-
ism-enhancing goals by exposing boys to multiple ways to live as 
men.216  The Boy Scouts, of course, loses a considerable amount of pri-
214 Church and other religious activities are exempted from this analysis, given the 
unique First Amendment protections extended to those activities.  I hope to consider 
church-based childrearing in future work. 
215 Cf. MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 27 (“Civil society is not a realm free of govern-
mental regulation.”).  Thus, the spaces between home and school would resist easy 
classification as part of either the public or private realms.  The spaces would not be 
subject to full regulation as part of the public sphere, but they would not be exempt 
from regulation as part of the private sphere either.  As such, many of the downsides of 
state regulation could potentially be avoided.  For an account of these downsides in 
different contexts, see Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541, 
1544-54 (2001). 
216 Andrew Koppelman has emphasized that gay children, both in and out of the 
Boy Scouts, could benefit from the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations 
law in this context, particularly if their parents are not open to embracing homosexual-
ity within the family.  See Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an 
Absolute Right To Discriminate?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 27, 43-47.  
But other children could benefit as well.  Children who have previously received only 
limited messages about homosexuality could benefit; children who will eventually work 
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vacy under this theory, because the organization would no longer be 
exempt from state public accommodations laws.  This loss, however, is 
solely a function of the Supreme Court’s allocation of more privacy to 
the Boy Scouts than to other private associations, such as the Jaycees, 
which are already subject to state public accommodations laws. 
The theory articulated here, in contrast, views organizations like 
the Boy Scouts as particularly worthy of being subject to state public 
accommodations laws, because the Boy Scouts is a private association 
engaged in childrearing.  Private associations are generally not per-
mitted to operate outside of the zone of state power.  Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court opinion in Jaycees makes clear, private associations are 
subject to limited state regulation even when adults’ interests are the 
only interests at stake.  It seems counterintuitive to relax such regula-
tions when children’s interests also are at stake, given that the state 
has an interest in modeling diverse behavior to children, in prepara-
tion for their future roles in civil society. 
In the context of the White Tail litigation, this normative approach 
would mean that the state could not enact regulations, such as the 
one at issue in that case, that, in effect, prevent the camp from engag-
ing in its desired form of childrearing.  Some may question whether 
this outcome actually supports the goal of pluralism, given that chil-
dren who attend nudist camps most likely have nudist parents.  How-
ever, the approach articulated here does not mandate that children 
be exposed to ways of life that are radically different from their par-
ents’ ways of life (and, presumably, children of nudists are already ex-
posed to the clothed lifestyle at school and in various commercial 
spaces).  Rather, the spaces between home and school can also expose 
children to different ways of living within their parents’ tradition.  If 
nudists are like most groups, there is likely much diversity even within 
the group. 
Some parents, like the parents in White Tail, likely will welcome 
the opportunity for their children to engage in such pluralism-
enhancing activities.  Although family law scholarship frequently ex-
tols parental control, many parents might find that they need or want 
and live with gays and lesbians could benefit; and all children could benefit from a 
broader notion of how to perform one’s gender and live one’s sexual life.  Indeed, 
both boys and girls may feel particularly limited by narrow constructions of gender and 
sexuality, and they often can benefit from exposure to alternative ways to live as men 
and women in this world.  See, e.g., Gagen, supra note 31, at 214-15 (discussing the work 
of Judith Butler); see also sources cited supra note 88 (analyzing the harm caused by in-
stitutions that inculcate rigid gender roles). 
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support from nonstate actors in the often overwhelming task of shap-
ing young lives.217  By explicitly acknowledging childrearing between 
home and school, and fostering such childrearing through pluralism-
enhancing regulation and nonregulation, the theory proposed here—
in contrast to the Dale opinion—would affirm that the responsibilities 
of childrearing need not be shouldered solely in private, but rather 
can be a vital part of the broader civil society.  The theory thus could 
support parents while still respecting their prerogatives. 
Other parents may be opposed to pluralism-enhancing activities.  
The theory articulated here does not intrude on the prerogatives of 
these parents, either.  Rather, pursuant to existing notions of family 
privacy, parents still have a right to limit their children’s participation 
in the spaces between home and school.  Nothing in this Article at-
tempts to change that right.  But once parents permit their children 
to participate in those spaces, there is no need for the law to view the 
spaces as outside of the zone of state power.  Rather, the law can en-
sure that the spaces between home and school remain vital locations 
of children’s development by exposing children to diverse ways of life.  
In this way, the law can promote pluralism both within the family and 
without. 
217 A few family law scholars, most notably Dorothy Roberts and Clare Huntington, 
have recently begun to call for a somewhat similar approach in the abuse and neglect 
context.  See Huntington, supra note 2, at 693 (defending the need to “reorient soci-
ety’s views of abuse and neglect away from the view that [they] are products of parental 
pathology, and toward a view . . . where a broader group . . . claims responsibility for 
the larger circumstances that led to the abuse or neglect”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The 
Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 27-35 (2005) (dis-
cussing the “community approach” to social work in child welfare cases).  These schol-
ars argue that abuse and neglect regimes in most states set up a false and unnecessary 
choice between parental control and state involvement, particularly in cases of poverty-
related neglect as opposed to physical or sexual abuse.  These scholars propose that, 
instead of leaving parents alone until they default and then removing the children to 
the custody of the state, the state should enlist the help of community members to de-
vise case plans whereby children at risk of neglect can remain with their parents if they 
receive support from community members.  Such support can remedy immediate fam-
ily problems, and the ties to the community that develop in the process of such prob-
lem solving can strengthen the family for the future.  There is no reason to assume 
that such community involvement can benefit only those parents at risk of committing 
abuse or neglect.  See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 56, at 1 (“The key message is that 
[most] parents need help, not only from extended family members and the commu-
nity at large, but also from government.”).  In addition, various studies show that fami-
lies are much less likely to become subject to state abuse and neglect proceedings if 
they have ties to the community.  Huntington, supra note 2, at 680-81. 
  
898 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 833 
 
CONCLUSION 
Acknowledging and examining childrearing between home and 
school can, without any further analysis, go a long way toward achiev-
ing family law’s goal of reflecting and supporting family life.  The ac-
knowledgment that such childrearing exists, that it is performed by 
diverse actors previously unrecognized by family law, and that chil-
dren often respond to it differently and receive different messages 
than they do at home and school, will hopefully lead to a more robust 
conception of child socialization within family law. 
Such acknowledgement also can clarify what is at stake for family 
law in the home and school spaces.  The existing scope of family law 
primarily defines home and school by relation to one another:  home 
is what school is not, and vice versa.  This approach is consistent with 
social science theories emphasizing that home is more than a spatial 
description, but instead also exists as a conceptual category.218  None-
theless, such an expansive legal conception of home risks obscuring 
the importance of the physical home and the activities that occur 
therein.  Similarly, an expansive conception of school can dilute the 
state’s focus on educating future citizens.  Acknowledging and exam-
ining the childrearing that occurs between home and school thus 
could increase family law’s understanding of childrearing in all loca-
tions, including home and school.   
Beyond better reflecting family life, such analysis can spur recon-
sideration of some of the fundamental normative positions of family 
law as a whole.  This Article has shown how analyzing childrearing be-
tween home and school can call into question family law’s existing 
approaches to privacy and pluralism.  By focusing on pluralism between 
families, family law has often overlooked the ways that there is little to 
no pluralism within families—largely because of family privacy.  In-
deed, family law scholars rarely have discussed what pluralism means 
for individual family members, or how the promise of pluralism might 
be made more meaningful for individual family members.  This Arti-
cle has proposed one way to address these questions, by showing how 
the law’s recognition of childrearing between home and school could 
increase children’s individual experiences of pluralism, while also pre-
serving the family’s role in maintaining a diverse, pluralistic society. 
 
218 See, for example, the studies of home discussed in Christensen et al., supra 
note 44, at 141-42. 
